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The general issue addressed by this thesis is the processes and dynamics of 
religious and ethnic identity construction and how identity construction mediates 
religious conversion amongst Chinese Muslim converts in Malaysian society. Chinese 
Muslim converts are often considered something of an enigma in Malaysia. This is 
mainly because of the imbrications between ethnicity and religion in Malaysia, based 
on the strong association between Muslim and Malay identity and a history of tension 
and conflict between the Malays and Chinese. Chinese Muslim converts interviewed 
perceive both identities as crucial to their self-concept. The identities, being Chinese 
and being Muslim, may appears as exclusive in the context of Malaysia; however, 
they are also considered too important to surrender for the converts. Accommodation 
of discrepant identities does not always result in an either/or decision that destroys 
one of the identities. Rather, identity negotiation can be constructed as a process in 
which much of these identities remain intact. Through a process of socialization, 
Chinese Muslim converts constructed and negotiated the boundaries and definitions of 
their religious and ethnic identity to include Islam into their daily life. The case study 
explores how Chinese Muslim converts’ religious identity is constructed through 
negotiation with their ethnic boundaries; and how these ethnic boundaries are 
reconstructed after their conversion 
 
Significant changes were found in Chinese Muslim convert’s daily life 
regarding their habits, their religious practices and their involvement in learning about 
Islamic doctrines. Religious identity for Chinese Muslim converts are constructed 
through the change of name and habits, which signify their Muslim identity publicly. 
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However, Islam is strongly associated with the Malay ethnic identity thus the Chinese 
Muslim’s explicit behavior associated with Islam is always being understood as a 
betrayal of their ethnic traditions. Hence, negotiation and certain adjustments have to 
be made in order for converts to obtain their new religious identity while remaining 
Chinese. Three different attitudes were found among respondents toward the issue of 
changing their name to an Islamic one after conversion and whether they use the 
Islamic or Chinese name to identify themselves in their daily life. It is found that the 
stronger hostility a convert faces from their family towards their conversion, the more 
hesitant s/he is to use their Islamic name and the more conscious s/he is on 
maintaining their Chinese name.   
 
Family hostility serves as the main motivation for Chinese Muslim converts to 
reconcile the dissonance between their ethnic and religious identity. Two major 
practices demonstrate how Chinese Muslim converts negotiate their ethnic and 
religious boundaries. Firstly, they participate in Chinese festivities yet not taking part 
in religious rituals in order not to contravene their new beliefs. Secondly, in response 
to their families’ concern of losing ties with their kinsmen, some respondents 
consciously maintained their surname and passed it on to their children.  
 
  This research provides an in-depth analysis on how religious converts 
negotiate between the new religious identity brought by conversion and their other 
(non-religious) existing identity. Although the case of Chinese Muslim converts is a 
unique situation, it raised the question of whether this same process occurs in diverse 
religious situations or conversion events. In conceptualizing religious identity change 
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or conversion as an either/or proposition, it is also important for us to look at the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 The general issue addressed by this thesis is how identity constructions that 
mediate religious conversion amongst Chinese Muslim converts in Malaysian society 
exemplify the processes and dynamics of religious and ethnic identity constructions. 
Chinese Muslim converts are often considered something of an enigma in Malaysia. 
This is due to the imbrications between ethnicity and religion in Malaysia brought 
about by the strong association between the Muslim and the Malay identity and 
furthermore by the history of tension and conflict between the Malay and the Chinese. 
Through research interviews conducted with Chinese Muslim converts in connection 
with this thesis, we can observe how they reconcile the discrepant roles of being 
Chinese and being Muslim in the Malaysian context. Accommodation of discrepant 
identities does not always result in an either/or decision that destroys one of the 
identities. Rather, accommodation through identity negotiation can be constructed as a 
process in which much of these differing identities remain intact. Chinese Muslim 
converts construct and negotiate the boundaries of their religious and ethnic identities 
through socialization to include Islam into their daily life. This accommodated but 
still distinctively Chinese identity enables them to resolve the dissonance between 
their religious beliefs and their ethnicity. Case studies in this thesis explore how 
Chinese Muslim converts’ religious identity is constructed through negotiation with 
their ethnic identity and how the ethnic boundaries that define their ethnicity are 
reconstructed after their conversion. Through an analysis of the interaction between 
Chinese Muslim converts and their significant others, especially their family, a 
complex process of identity construction and negotiation comes to light.  
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 Malaysia is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society composed of three major 
ethnic groups – Malay, Chinese and Indian. These ethnic categories, which were first 
constructed by the British colonial government, remain a social norm after 
Independence in 1957. Despite the continued labeling of these ethnic categories, each 
of these labels share a common flaw in that they never represent a homogenous group 
of people, but many  sub-ethnic groups placed within each ethnic category (Tan 1982). 
The Malay and Chinese are the two largest ethnic groups in Malaysia, and the conflict 
between these two groups make up an important part of the country’s history. This is 
most significantly reflected by the imposition of the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
after the ethnic based riot between the Chinese and Malays in May 1969. It is argued 
that the conflict between these two ethnic groups is more related to the unequal 
distribution of economic and political power than any ethnic differences. At the time 
of the riot, it is generally understood that the Chinese dominated the economic sphere 
while Malays controlled the political realm. With the outbreak of an ethnic based riot, 
the Malaysian government gave up its lassie-faire policy and imposed a series of 
‘affirmative policies’ to promote the privilege status of the Malays, who are the 
‘bumiputera’ or ‘sons-of-the-soil’: the definitive indigenous people of Malaysia.  
 
 Segregation between the Chinese and the Malay rests on conflicting political 
and economic interests. Institutionally, the Malaysian Constitution clearly lays down 
the ethnic boundary between the Malay and Chinese. As defined by the Constitution, 
a Malay is a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay 
language, conforms to Malay customs’ and is a citizen of Malaysia (Gabriel 2000: 42). 
As the Malay language serves as the national language of Malaysia and all citizens are 
expected to learn it in school, eventually all Malaysians more or less speak Malay. 
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Hence linguistic difference no longer becomes a good indicator of ethnic boundaries 
or distinctiveness. Likewise, Malay culture is a dynamic concept that is difficult to 
define and include various and distinct ethnic minorities which are increasingly 
claiming to be practicing Malay culture such as the Orang Asli who can trace a 
history back to the Malacca Sultanate period. As a result of these factors that conflict 
with the Constitutional definition of what defines a Malay, it is not surprising that 
Islam becomes the most distinctive ethnic indicator to distinguish the Malays from 
other ethnic groups.  Because of the intimate association between Malay identity and 
Islam and the history of ethnic tension and conflict between the Malays (read: 
Muslims) and the Chinese, Chinese Muslim converts often find themselves in an 
uncomfortable position in Malaysian society as they fall in between these defined 
ethnic boundaries.  
 
Upon their conversion to Islam, Chinese Muslim converts’ new religious 
identity is constructed. Conversion from one religion to another means changes that 
involve large areas of personality – from spiritual beliefs to an individual’s daily 
routine. These changes caused by conversion fundamentally transform the convert’s 
conception of the world and both in how he relates and understands the world and 
how the world perceives him. Thus, becoming Muslim resulted in the change of 
identity at both a personal and a public level. To ‘pass as a convert’ (Beckford 1978), 
Chinese Muslims have to construct their newly obtained Muslim identity by 
establishing boundaries that coincide with their new religious beliefs. Religious 
boundaries comprise those aspects of the respondents’ lives which identify themselves 
and others as members of the religious group. To understand the process of 
establishing boundaries, it is useful to look at religiously oriented actions that bring 
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significant changes and influence day-to-day interaction between Muslims and non-
Muslims. These actions, according to my respondents’ experiences, include changing 
one’s name; changing beliefs, practices and habits; and learning about the doctrine of 
Islam.   
 
  Chinese Muslim converts also experience dilemmas about their Chinese 
identity after conversion. Their explicit behavior associated with Islam is considered 
betraying their ethnic Chinese traditions. Their ‘performance’ as Chinese, in Goffman 
(1959)’s term, is not fulfilling the ascribed characteristics of their expected ethnic role 
to their peers (fellow Chinese) in a consistent manner. The hostility from family 
towards their conversion serves as one of the motives for Chinese Muslim converts to 
reconcile the difference between their expected role as Chinese and the new social 
identity as Chinese Muslim.  Often they have to prove that they have not become 
Malays and have to make adjustments to reconcile their new religious identity and 
their Chinese ethnicity. In this case, we are not looking at the function of ethnic 
boundaries to distinguish between the ‘we-group’ and the ‘other’, but the ethnic 
relation at the intra-group level. Based on the existing “structure,” ethnic boundaries 
for Chinese Muslim converts are negotiated and reconstructed. This structure includes 
cultural content that serves to identify ethnic boundary markers such as clothing, food 
and language. The respondents are not creating or constructing a new social collective, 
but simply re-constructing their pre-existing understanding of what it means to be 
Chinese. For instance, while changing names serves as a symbolic action to signify 
the very first step of establishing their Muslim identity in a public manner, most of the 




Who are the Chinese Muslims in Malaysia? 
 Before we continue the current situation of Chinese Muslim converts in 
Malaysia, it is important for us to know about who are the Chinese Muslims we are 
discussing. According to various studies (The 1986; The 1993; Lombard & Salmon 
2001; Ma 2002) about Chinese Muslim communities in Malaysia, these communities 
existed throughout the history of Southeast Asia. Historians found that conversion to 
Islam has been happening amongst the Chinese community in Southeast Asia since 
they first arrived in the region. Most of these communities have fully-assimilated to 
the various local communities and often their Chinese origin is now hardly 
recognizable (Lombard & Salmon 2001; Ma 2002). 
 
 Muslims from China played an important role in the Islamization of Southeast 
Asia. Back up to 15th century, it is found that the Muslim community in Guangzhou, 
China, had participated actively in trading in the Southeast Asia region (Lombard & 
Salmon 2001). Furthermore, one of the most significant Muslim players from China 
was Admiral Zhen He, a Muslim from Yunnan, who led seven imperial naval 
expeditions to the West, through Southeast Asia, during the Ming Dynasty (1368-
1644). Zheng He is widely respected by Chinese communities in Southeast Asia 
because of his significant contribution to them. He not only strengthened the 
relationship between China and Southeast Asian countries, but also left behind his 
crew members in various parts of Southeast Asia that increased the size of Chinese 
communities. It is suggested that he also played an important role in preaching Islam 
to the Chinese communities by using their native Chinese language (Ma 2002).  
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 Nowadays, there are generally two different groups of Chinese Muslim in 
Malaysia, who practice Islam. There were Chinese migrants from China who were 
originally Muslims before they moved to Malaysia. Studies on this group (Tan 1988; 
Ma 2002) have tended to be anthropological or historical in nature focusing on their 
history of migration. This group of Chinese Muslims is extremely small and most of 
the subsequent generations have either assimilated into the Malay community or 
stopped practicing Islam. A study by Tan shows that in the state of Trengganu these 
original Chinese Muslims from China identify themselves as ‘Hui hui’ in order to 
distinguish themselves from local Malay Muslims and the Chinese Muslims converts 
(Tan 1988). 
 
 The other group is Chinese Muslims in Malays who were born and raised in 
Malaysia and converted to Islam at some point during their lives. Sociological studies 
about Chinese Muslim in Malaysia are mainly focusing on this group. Nagata 
describes Chinese Muslim converts as ‘a social anomaly who exist in an ethnic limbo’ 
(Nagata, 1978), because they are not welcomed by the Malay community who suspect 
their motives of conversion and they are also rejected by the Chinese community for 
having ‘gone over to the Malays’ (Nagata, 1978). This is the group that has to face the 
dilemma of being Muslim and being Chinese. They were born and raised in Chinese 
Malaysian families and have always been socialized and subsequently presented 
themselves as Chinese. This ethnic identity is challenged after conversion because the 
boundaries that define Chinese Muslim converts’ new religious identity contradict 
with general understanding of the boundaries that define Chinese ethnic identity in 
Malaysia. This converted group of Chinese Muslims is the best example for 
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understanding the process of identity transformations and is the focus of this study of 
identity construction and reconstruction. 
 
Chinese Muslim Converts in Malaysia 
Chinese Muslims only comprise a small proportion1 of Chinese population in 
Malaysia and there are few known statistics on Chinese Muslim converts. Although 
converts are required to register with the state’s Jabatan Agama Islam2,or Department 
of Islamic Affairs and Administrations, in order to obtain a legalized Muslim status, 
statistics on the exact number of new converts and their ethnicity are not open to the 
public. When I was conducting my fieldwork research in Malaysia, I tried to contact 
officials from Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (JAKIM) 3 , or Department of 
Islamic Advancement Malaysia, about statistical information but was told that ‘it is 
too sensitive’ and was refused access. I assume the possible reason why the 
information is sensitive is because of ethnic politics in Malaysia. As suggested by 
Osman Chuah, politicians may manipulate the data and attack the government on their 
religious policies. 
 
                                                 
1
 Tan (2000) states that in 1970, there were 5,342 Chinese Muslims in Peninsular Malaysia. The 1991 
census shows a big increase in the number of Chinese Muslims, totaling 17,117, which is 0.4% of the 
Chinese population of 4,609,049 surveyed. Ma (2002) states that in 2000, there were 57,221 Chinese 
Muslims in Malaysia (including Sabah and Sarawak), which constituted 1% of the total Chinese 
population in Malaysia. 
2
 Jabatan Agama Islam, or Department of Islamic Affairs and Administration, which responsible for 
the Islamic affairs at the state level under the operation of the Sultan who has the highest power on 
religious affairs in his own state. Jabatan Agama Islam had been set up in all 13 states in Malaysia, 
including the Federal Territories (Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya and Labuan). Different from the others, the 
Jabatan Agama Islam Wilayah Perskutuan (JAWI), or Department of Islamic Affairs and 
Administration of Federal Territories, is administrated by JAKIM under the Prime Minister’s Office 
3
 JAKIM, or Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (Department of Islamic Advancement Malaysia), is a 
department under the operation of Prime Minister’s Office. It serves as a coordinating body of different 
religious department in different states. It also operates the Jabatan Agama Islam in Federal Territories, 
and has special divisions in Sabah and Sarawak (JAKIM Caw Sabah and JAKIM Caw Sarawak) which 
serves mainly for the purpose of preaching Islam in the Eastern Malaysia. 
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 ‘For example, the Islamic-based parties may use the data on the converts 
to accuse the government for not having done enough to convert the non-
Muslims or not having done enough for helping the Muslim converts. The 
non-Muslim ethnic political parties, however, may wish to blame the 
government for converting the non-Muslims to the Islamic 
faith……besides, the number of conversions being a sensitive issue, there 
may be inter-religious and interethnic conflict if the data is released to the 
public. The Christians in Malaysia may not be happy with the number of 
Christians who had converted to Islam. The Chinese and Indians also may 
not like their fellow ethnic members converting to Islam.’ (Chuah 2001: 25) 
  
Since I was unable to collect first hand data on the number of Chinese Muslim 
converts, I had to rely on the secondary data from other scholars’ work. According to 
Chuah (2001), the number of Muslim converts in Malaysia is steadily increasing from 
541 in 1967 to 4,069 in 1990. There are more than 3,600 Muslim converts in Malaysia 
on average each year. According to the census in 2000, there are 57,221 Chinese 
Muslims, which is 1% of the total Chinese population in Malaysia. Selangor is the 
state where most of the Chinese Muslims are concentrated (17,246), followed by 
Sabah (8,589), Kuala Lumpur (7,991) and Sarawak (7,287) (Ma 2002). However, the 
numbers of converts are not indicated in this data.   
 
 As shown in Chart 1.1, in the state of Selangor, the number of Muslim 
converts has been steadily increased from 207 in 1972 to 633 in 2000. In Chart 1.2, 
according to the annual report of the Division of Dakwah of JAIS, the number of 
Chinese Muslim converts in 2001 is 105. During the period of January to May in 2001, 
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there were 148 Chinese converted and registered with JAIS (Jabtan Agama Islam 
Selangor 2001).  
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Previous studies on Chinese Muslims converts show that they are typically a 
marginalized group. Nagata (1978) describes them in the following manner: 
 
‘The Chinese Muslims in many cases are no longer regarded as full 
Chinese and jeopardize their bonds to the patrilineage. They become a 
social anomaly, and exist in an ethnic limbo.’ (Nagata 1978:113) 
  
Chinese Muslims have to face a lot of challenges after their conversion. As 
suggested by Rosey Ma (1996), several major issues include: problems with family 
members opposed to their conversion arise because of various reasons such as inter-
ethnic marriage, their family’s lack of understanding or misleading knowledge about 
Islam, problems at the workplace including change of treatment from Chinese 
colleagues, and problems with Malay in-laws and friends who are suspicious about 
their motives of conversion and their practice of the religion. 
 
 The main reason for these challenges, as discussed by many scholars (Ma 
1996; Chuah 2001), is that Chinese Muslim converts’ motives of conversion are under 
suspect by both the Chinese and Malay communities. One of the stereotypes of 
Chinese Muslim converts is that their conversion is due to ‘convenience and 
opportunism’ (Long 1989). It is suspected that Chinese who converted to Islam are 
not really sincere to the religion, but do so in order to obtain certain benefits and 
conversion is only an artifice to get marry with Malay. Hence their conversions are 
deemed for convenience, and Malay Muslims are very suspect of their practice of 
Islam. Especially since the 1969 riots and the implementation of the New Economic 
Policy in the 1970s, in which differences between bumiputera and non-bumiputera 
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statuses became emphasized, Muslims converts are often seen as opportunists who 
want to attain the privileged Malay status. Malays (Muslims) are the definitive 
bumiputera who are accorded with special privileges such as preferences to enter 
tertiary education and procuring government jobs and so on. In addition, bumiputera-
owned companies also receive special assistance from the government. Thus, it is 
believed that the underlying motives for Chinese Muslim converts are about having 
access to bumiputera status and enjoying special privileges. Also, some argue that 
Chinese Muslim converts aspire to obtain special financial subsidies provided by the 
PERKIM or the state’s Jabatan Agama Islam.  
 
 However, some of these suspicious may no longer be valid. With the rapid 
economic growth in Malaysia during the 1980s and 1990s, the economic gap between 
the Chinese and the Malays has become smaller. In addition, the lifting of the 
affirmative NEP policy that privileges bumiputera in the business sector indicates a 
shift away from the institutional provision of privileges for Malay-Muslims.  
 
 Converting to Islam does not mean that Chinese Muslims can obtain Malay or 
bumiputera status in the institutional sense. In the early 1960s, Chinese who 
converted to Islam were able to change their name and their ethnic identification from 
Chinese to Malay on their official documents such as their passport and identity card. 
However, since the 1980s, Chinese converts can no longer change their official ethnic 
identification. They remain identified as Chinese. There are also new regulations in 
terms of name changing. For instance, converts who registered with the Jabatan 
Agama Islam Selangor (JAIS), or Department of Islamic Affairs and Administration 
of Selangor, were required to adopt an Islamic name and put ‘binte Abdullah’ (for 
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female, i.e. daughter of the servant of God) or ‘bin Abdullah’ (for male, i.e. son of the 
servant of God) at the end of their new Muslim name to signify their convert identity.  
 
After the imposition of new regulations in 1996, it has not been compulsory 
for converts to adopt an Islamic name. In Selangor, converts are free to maintain their 
original name, or combines their original and Islamic name together. They are not 
obligated to change their names officially, which normally announces the Chinese 
Muslim convert’s identity publicly, for the sake of conversion in the institutional 
sense. However, name changing is still compulsory in some other states due to the 
different requirements of the Jabatan Agama Islam in different states.  
 
 Although converting to Islam is understood by both the Malay and Chinese 
communities as ‘masuk Melayu’, or ‘becoming Malay’ socially, conversion does not 
mean that they are totally accepted as Malay. These converts may be considered 
‘Saudara Baru’, or ‘new brother and sisters/ associates converted to Islam’. As a 
result, for the Malay community, Chinese converts are only fully recognized if they 
adopt the Malay way of life upon conversion. Long (1989) argues that this association 
of Islam with being Malay is not related to Islamic doctrine but is a product unique to 
Malay culture. The conflicts between Chinese identity and Muslim identity are 
socially codified. She describes the general conception of Islamic custom equals to 
Malay custom as a cultural cluster. Malays have their own way to understand Islam, 
which is why they understand conversion as ‘masuk Melayu’ and judging converts 
based on ‘Malay ways of life’. Thus, Chinese Muslim converts were always 
understood as Malay, especially if they present their Muslim identity at public level in 
their clothing, their gesture of greeting and their name. However, most of the 
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respondents in this research project expressed their concern at being perceived as 
Malay and this is one of the motivations behind their defense of their Chinese 
boundaries during the post-conversion period. 
 
 Existing research on the subject of religious conversion has often focused on 
the outcome, or product, while failing to examine the processes leading to the 
outcome.  These studies usually focus on the reason for conversion to Islam and the 
social difficulties arising from the conversion. The general focus is on whether the 
converts could be accepted by the Malay community, how well they were accepted by 
the Malay community and how they were rejected by the Chinese community 
(Edmonds 1968; Siow 1983; Lim 1983; The 1993; Chua 2001).  Also, most of these 
studies on Chinese Muslim converts adopt a quantitative method (Lim 1983; Chuah 
2001). Undoubtedly, these studies provide a comprehensive understanding of Chinese 
Muslim converts in Malaysia and a useful bibliographical background. However, the 
dynamics between reasons and consequences have been under-explored. Personal 
identity and religious transformation is often a long-term process that extends over 
time and is not necessarily a process that is preoccupied with or focused on the end 
result. Thus, I hope to provide through my thesis an in-depth study of the dynamics of 
identity construction, focusing on the process, amongst Chinese Muslim converts 
during the post-conversion period. 
 
 In this research, I focus on an ‘inward’ perspective by using qualitative 
methods to understand the self-identifications of Chinese Muslim converts. My 
intention in undertaking this study has, from the outset, been about developing an 
understanding of the issue of religious conversion based on an analysis 
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articulated by converts themselves. Thus, this research focuses on the respondents’ 
concept of ethnicity and of religion and how they respond to conflicts between their 
ethnic and religious identity as a result of conversion 
 
In short, the research questions for this project are identified as follow: 
• What is the current situation of Chinese Muslim converts?  
• How do Chinese Muslim converts identify themselves?  
• How do Chinese Muslim converts achieve their Muslim identity after 
conversion? 
• How do Chinese Muslim converts respond to the challenges to their ethnic 
identity? 
• What are the difficulties that they face in terms of identity construction? 
 
Methodology 
 Qualitative research methods are adopted in this research project. In order to 
understand the experience of conversion and the kinds of processes that Chinese 
Muslims have to undergo, I used a one-to-one in-depth interview to collect detailed 
information about their personal histories and experiences and their 
conceptualizations of ethnicity and religious identity. This research is an exploratory 
one in which issues that Chinese Muslims converts have to confront, including their 
own perception of their religious and ethnic identities, are the main areas of focus. 
 
 Fieldwork research was conducted in June, July and November 2003. My 
research site is the state of Selangor and Kuala Lumpur area, where the highest 
number of Chinese Muslim converts is found in Peninsular Malaysia. Eighteen 
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Chinese Muslims converts are identified as core respondents and at least one in-depth 
interview is conducted with each respondent. I located three organizations as the 
initial points-of-contact to locate my respondents, they include 1) Malaysian Chinese 
Muslim Association (MACMA); 2) Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia 
(PERKIM), or Muslim Welfare Organization Malaysia; and 3) Islamic Outreach 
ABIM. From these organizations, I identified my first five respondents and these 
initial interview subjects introduced me to friends of theirs who are also converts. 
Also, I was able to locate four respondents at the National University of Malaysia 
where my affiliated institute is located.  
 
 I recognize that obtaining my subjects through these organizations provided 
my data with a particular bias. For example, converts who participated in the 
aforementioned contact organizations, which organized a lot of educational programs 
about Islam, are generally more committed to the religion. However, I respond to this 
concern in two ways. Firstly, as stated above, while this was my initial method for 
recruiting subjects, it was not my only method. Secondly, while this method does 
possibly introduce a particular bias into the character of my subjects’ accounts, it also 
may allow both me and my subjects to be more open than we might have been had we 
met with no third-party introduction. If the organizers of the NGOs make the 
introductions, then both my subject and I have at least some degree of assurance that 
we are both dealing with a sane and harmless person who has been endorsed by a 
trusted authority. While I recognize that there are costs to my recruiting method, I also 
believe that these methods have unique benefits, and that I have alleviated some 
concerns by using several complementary methods.  
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 Interviews are conducted based on a set of questions. The questions serve as a 
guideline for the researcher to ask relevant questions during the interview. The 
schedule is divided into five parts: 1) Respondents’ background, to ensure that their 
personal particulars is accurately collected; 2) Relationship with family before and 
after conversion; 3) Conversion, reason for conversion and the process they had gone 
through; 4) Ethnicity, how they perceive themselves as Chinese; and 5) Religious 
practices, how they learn about the religion and how involved they are in the religion. 
After the first round of interviews, three major issues were identified as indicators of 
converts’ construction and reconstruction of their religious and ethnic identity. These 
issues include: 1) acquiring knowledge about Islam; 2) practicing of Chinese customs 
and 3) changing name after conversion. A second interview was again conducted with 
respondents who had not talked about these issues during the first interview so that all 
respondents’ opinion were recorded.  
 
The Respondents 
 The empirical material discussed in this paper is derived from the formal 
interviews held with eighteen respondents. The sample of respondents was comprised 
of twelve men and six women. Of the respondents, I met eight through Malaysian 
Chinese Muslim Association, four through Islamic Outreach ABIM, and six through 
personal introductions by fellow-respondents. At the time of the interviews, all were 
aged between 22 and 50 with over half of them over the age of 30.  Seven of the 
males and two of the females were married. Of the married respondents, there is one 
case of dual marriage, seven married Malay; one married a Chinese Muslim; one 
married a Filipino-Muslim and one married an Arab. Among the respondents, all of 
them had received some level of higher education with seven finishing college. One is 
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currently pursing a Bachelors’ degree, three are Bachelors’ degree holders, two are 
pursing Masters’ degrees, two are Masters’ degree holders, and three are PhD degree 
holders.   
 
Field-work Problems 
 The research was productive because requests were almost invariably met with 
remarkable generosity. At the same time, the field-work inevitably had its 
shortcomings as a result of both the general methodology adopted and the specifics of 
the situation in which I found myself. Accurate representation of the sample is one of 
the problems here because of the small sampling size. Indeed, my sample of 
respondents was biased in several ways. The most significant bias problem with the 
sample was that it was weighted in favor of an educated group who was inclined to 
identify with the Chinese community in one way or another, was interested in learning 
about Islam and was really practicing the religion. This bias was unavoidable: because 
of my ‘snowballing’ approach to building up a network of respondents and because 
many of my initial points of contact were university and NGOs like the Malaysian 
Chinese Muslims Association and the Islamic Outreach ABIM, it simply was not 
possible for me to come into contact with individuals who had completely cut 
themselves off from the community. I am not able to gain access to the group of 
converts who embrace Islam for ‘practical reasons’ like marriage without practicing 
the religion or who are not involved in those organizations.  
 
Organization of the Thesis 
 In this thesis I attempt to look at the religious conversion experience of 
Chinese Muslim converts in Malaysia and to demonstrate the complex and dynamic 
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process of their identity construction in the post-conversion period, with special focus 
on how they resolve the dissonance between their ethnic and religious identities.   
 
 In Chapter 2, I will try to illustrate some of the major concepts that I have 
adopted and how it serves as the framework in this research project. Religious 
conversion can be understood as a significant change of a person’s identity and world 
view. Berger & Luckmann (1967) describes the conversion process as a conversation 
with significant others, through which the individual co-creates and actively 
appropriates his social world. Commitment following conversion often forms a 
sociological boundary in a community; however, it does not mean that converts have 
to cut off completely with their previous community. Significant others from the ‘pre-
conversion social world’, especially the family, serve as the motivational factor for 
the Chinese Muslim converts to maintain a Chinese identity while also becoming 
Muslim.   Due to the imbrications of religion and ethnicity in the context of Chinese 
converts to Islam in Malaysia, Chinese Muslims’ explicit behavior of being Muslim 
became a threat to their Chinese identity. At this point, religious and ethnic identities 
are being constructed and negotiated in the post-conversion period. 
 
 Chapter 3 examines certain key aspects of the social environment that shape 
respondents’ ethnic and religious identities. First, I will illustrate the official 
boundaries that are set up by the state which clearly define the status of Chinese 
Muslim converts in the state system. An analysis of these boundaries will help us 
clear up the fallacy that Chinese Muslim converts want to become Malay, or, that they 
are becoming Malay. Secondly, I will illustrate the motivations and pattern of these 
Chinese Muslim’s conversions.  
 19 
 
 Chapter 4 investigates the construction of respondents’ religious identity. 
After conversion, Islam is unavoidably associated with their social identity. The 
boundaries which define the distinctiveness of Muslim identity guarantee that certain 
social distance between the Muslim and non-Muslim exist. I will try to demonstrate 
how the converts construct their religious identity and negotiate with their ethnic 
boundaries.  
 
 Chapter 5 discusses how the hostility from family towards the respondents’ 
conversion serves as the motivation for them to defend their Chinese ethnic identity or 
“Chineseness.”  It concerns the respondents’ own definitions of the ethnic group of 
which they are a part and how the respondents negotiate their ethnic identity after the 
conversion. Several issues will be discussed here including why the respondents 
define themselves as Chinese (conceptualization of Chineseness); how negotiation 
took place along the cultural line; and how culture was reinterpreted by the converts 
to understand Chineseness.  
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Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework 
 
 Identity construction can be best understood as a facet of adult socialization. 
From the symbolic interactionist perspective, socialization is the process by which the 
self internalizes social meanings, reinterprets them, and in turn, responds back upon 
society. During this process, the ‘core identity’ is formed and it serves as the 
fundamental self concept for the individual. The stability of the core identity resides 
in the interplay between one’s continual experience of the world and interaction with 
significant others. However, what happen when the core identity is being challenged 
because of a change of social world that is brought about by religious conversion? 
 
 In this chapter, I will illustrate how I conceptualized the major concepts that I 
employed in my analysis: socialization, identity construction, religious conversion 
and identity negotiation. Theoretically, I am concerned with the construction and 
reconstruction of the transformed identity of the converts, with special emphasis on 
the conflicts of converts’ religious and ethnic identity in the post-conversion period 
and how they resolve the dissonance in between. In order to have a better 
understanding of the identity construction in the post-conversion period, it is 
important to also look at the process of conversion that leads to that circumstances.  
 
Socialization and Identity Construction 
 The symbolic interactionist perspective offers a description of the dynamics 
involved in socialization. Compared with the structural functionalist perspective, 
which defines socialization from the point of view of the society or the social group to 
which an individual belongs, the symbolic interactionist perspective views 
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socialization from the individual’s point of view rather than the group’s. The 
emphasis is on the development of the person, rather than on the transmission of 
culture. George Herbert Mead, one of the founders of symbolic interactionist 
approach, argues that identity is constructed through an understanding of the 
projection of the self to others. According to Mead (1967), the process of identity 
construction is mainly based on the categories that exist in society. It is through 
interaction with the others that one can obtain the meaning of these categories and 
organizes one’s consciousness, which later on become a sediment solid identity for 
the individual. 
 
Erving Goffman reaffirmed Mead’s arguments that it is through the interaction 
of self and society that meaning systems are created and sustained. In his Presentation 
of Self in Everyday Life, Goffman (1959) provides a detailed description and analysis 
of process and meaning in social interaction. By using a dramaturgical approach, he 
views interaction as a performance, shaped by environment and audience, constructed 
to provide others with impressions that are consistent with the desired goals of the 
actor (Goffman 1959: 17). The process of establishing social identity, then, becomes 
closely allied to the concept of the ‘front’, which is defined as ‘that part of the 
individual performance which regularly functions in a general and fixed fashion to 
define the situation for those who observe the performance’ (Goffman 1959: 22). The 
front is the standardized domain which allows others to understand the individual on 
the basis of projected character traits that have normative meanings. The actor, in 
order to present a compelling front, is forced to fulfill the duties of the social role and 
communicate the activities and characteristics of the role to other people in a 
consistent manner. This process is predicated upon the activities of ‘impression 
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management’ (Goffman 1959: 208), the control and communication of information 
through the performance. Actors attempt to present an ‘idealized’ version of the front 
which is more consistent with the norms of society particularly in front of the 
audience. This role-taking process reflects the dynamics of socialization. Socialization 
is the process by which the self internalizes social meanings, reinterprets them, and in 
turn, responds to society. As such, socialization can be viewed as the continual 
formation of self-concept over time (Gecas 1986). Its focus tends to be the 
development of self-concept, identity, and various attitudes dispositions and behaviors 
of the individual. From this perspective, identity construction and negotiation, is a 
part of the natural process in which people create a more stable and coherent self-
concept (Straus 1976; Gecas 1982).  
 
 One of the key processes in socialization is the concept of identification. 
According to Viktor Gecas, ‘identification with the socializer or the socializing group 
makes one more receptive to their influence and motivated to be socialized in 
accordance with their standards. It is in the interest of socializing agents and agencies 
to encourage the socializees’ identification with their socializers, and in the process, 
to develop identities appropriate to the group’s purposes and goals’ (Gecas 1981:166).  
 
 Socialization typically takes place in organized social contexts. The changes 
that individuals undergo as a result of social influences become sociologically 
relevant in the context of organized social relationships. Social structure is commonly 
defined as the stable patterns of social interaction within a group. However, the 
concept also subsumes other aspects of the groups such as its composition, size, 
density, permeability of boundaries, and so forth. Different social structures of various 
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socialization settings set the stage for the socialization process that take place. Much 
of the socialization that takes place in our society occurs in the context of social 
institutions or organizations, such as the family, school, and work setting. At the level 
of general organization goals, Wheeler (1966) distinguishes between two different 
socialization systems.. The ‘developmental socialization system’ refers to 
organizations ‘whose formal purpose is the training, education or, more generally, the 
further socialization of the individuals passing through’ (Wheeler 1966:68). Family is 
one of these organizations that affect individual’s core identity. It is the context in 
which individual’s initial sense of self develops and basic identities, motivations, 
values and beliefs are formed. This development of self occurs through most of the 
major processes and mechanisms of socialization like modeling, role-playing, labeling 
and social comparison, which are enhanced by the general process of identification. 
One’s understanding of sex roles, age roles, and ethnicity are learned in these 
processes and the fundamental understanding between one’s self and the other usually 
serves as the source of the individual’s major identities. The ‘re-socializing systems’ 
refers to organizations ‘where the formal purpose is to make up for or correct some 
deficiency in earlier socialization’ (1966:68). This system can take place in any type 
of social organizations that individual encounter with over their life time. 
   
Ethnicity as Core Identity 
 Often one’s self concept becomes organized around a central or ‘core identity’ 
construct (Gecas 1981), which gives some unity or consistence to the other identities 
of the person. This does to imply that all everyone’s self-concepts are directed by a 
strong core identity, or that all people strive to maintain complete self-consistency. 
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The tendency to develop a strong identity, however, is intrinsic to certain societal 
roles or contexts.  
 
 In the context of Malaysia, for example, ethnicity could be described as one of 
the core identities for the majority population. Different ethnic categories are 
constructed historically and socially, and eventually became a major source of 
identification for the individual in daily life. For instance, Chinese in Malaysia never 
represent a homogeneous group of people, they or their ancestors originated from 
various part of China with different dialects and different customs. Tan (1997) 
provides an insightful investigation of the construction of ethnic identities among 
Chinese in Malaysia. He suggests that despite their different places of origin among 
Chinese in Malaysia, the level of socialization and localization that the individual 
received also shapes their ethnic and cultural identities. Ethnic identities for the 
Chinese in Malaysia are a ‘multi-level and multi-faceted concept’ (Tan 1997:114). 
However, no matter how diverse it is within the group of Chinese in terms of 
language and custom, all the Chinese see themselves as belonging to one ethnic group 
vis-à-vis Malays and other Malaysians. Therefore, ethnicity in Malaysia serves as a 
significant boundary to distinguish the ‘self and the others’ (cf. Barth 1969).  
 
 In the case of Chinese Muslim converts, the state and family are two 
socializing institutions that composed most of the social context of their early and 
fundamental identity formation. Family plays an important role in establishing this 
core-identity because it serves as the agent to pass on the shared history, customs and 
other components that define the boundary of Chineseness. Furthermore, family 
members are the closest “others” that an individual can identify with within the ethnic 
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group. The state also plays an important role in establishing the ethnic identity. Islam 
was used as a tool in the post-independence nation-building project which serves as 
the major component of constructing the Malay identity. The official boundary 
between Malay (Muslim) and non-Malay (non-Muslim) is clearly defined by the 
Constitution (Gabriel 2000:42). Furthermore, ethnic-based affirmative action policies 
implemented in the 1970s, derived from the history of conflict between Malay and 
Chinese, solidified ethnic segregation in Malaysia.  
 
 The stability of the core identity resides in the interplay between one’s 
continual experience of the world, the relative meaning assigned to such experiences, 
the plausibility of these meaning systems of ordering existence, and one’s interaction 
with a significant ‘reference group’ (Lofland 1969). Religious conversion brings 
about significant changes in these aspects. In the process of religious conversion, an 
individual’s social world will be changed with a new religious identity for the 
individual. What happens when an alternative identity created by religious conversion 
poses challenges to the core identity? Before we move on to discuss the impact of 
religious conversion, we should look at what religious conversion means and how it 




 The one theme that pervades literature on religious conversion involves the 
experience of radical personal change. Although there are different opinions on the 
forms of change - whether it is change from one religious tradition to another or re-
commitment within same religious tradition (Travisano 1970); and latitude of change 
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- whether the change should be sudden, gradual, or multiple and serial changes 
(Roberts 1990), the one agreement that we could draw upon the studies of religious 
conversion is that personal change is not one dimensional and that the concept of 
religious conversion ‘is but one type of personal change’ (Snow & Machalek 
1984:170). These changes, as suggested by Snow & Machalek (1984), can be 
operationalized and represented by three empirical indicators of conversion: 
membership status, demonstration events, and rhetorical patterns. 
 
 Shifts in organizational affiliation and demonstration events are essentially 
public displays of conversion that function as status confirmation rituals. In the 
tradition of Islam, rituals are compulsory and they are often symbols of difference 
between believers and non-believers. Conversion to Islam entails reciting Shahadah in 
the presence of at least one witness that declares ‘there is no god but God and 
Muhammad is the messenger of God’ and this serves as the first of five pillars of 
Islam. Performance of other required duties, the other four pillars of Islam – paying 
zakah4, five daily prayers5, performance of hajj6, and fasting during Ramadan7 – is 
                                                 
4
 Required almsgiving that is one of the five pillars of Islam. Muslims with financial means are 
required to give 2.5 percent of their net worth annually as zakah. To practicing Muslims, zakah 
connotes the path to purity, comprehension of material responsibility, and an enhanced sense of 
spirituality. Zakah is used for the needy, for propagation of the faith, to free slaves, to relieve debtors, 
to help travelers, and for the administration of zakah, as well as other efforts approved by religious 
authorities. (Esposito 2003:345) 
5
 The second pillar of Islam is the prayers required of Muslims five time daily: daybreak (salat al-fajr), 
noon (salat al-duhr), mid-afternoon (salat al-asr), sunset (salat al-maghreb) and evening (salat al-isha). 
The times of prayer are determined by the sun’s position and are announced in a human voice by the 
muezzine (prayer announcer) from the minaret (tower) of a mosque. Can be performed in any clean 
space, either individually or communally (preferable), although Friday noon prayer (jumah) should be 
performed communally in the mosque by men. Prayers must be preceded by ritual purification (wudu) 
and declaration of proper intention (niyyah). Consists of recitations from the Qur’an and formulas in 
praise of God (takbir); must be done facing the direction of the Kaaba in Mecca (qiblah). (Esposito 
2003:275) 
6
 The annual pilgrimage to Mecca during the month of Dhu al-Hijjah. All adult Muslims are required to 
perform it at least once in their lives if they are physically and financially able. Pilgrims dress modestly 
and simply, proclaiming the equality and humility of all believers before God, regardless of worldly 
differences in race, nationality, class, age, gender, or culture. Properly performed, the hajj absolves the 
pilgrim from all previous sins. The hajj often serves as a rite of passage, coinciding with life events 
such as adulthood, marriage, career change, retirement, illness, or death. It may serve as an initiation 
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expected to follow. By performing the conversion rituals and adopting the expected 
religious pillars, conversion also represents a transformation in a person’s self-image. 
The change is often symbolized by a change of name. Male converts are expected to 
be circumcised. Female converts are expected to adopt modest dress. Both sexes often 
adopt Muslim names and no longer eat pork or drink alcohol. In the context of 
Malaysia particularly, where Islam is the official religion, religious conversion is even 
being institutionalized. Converts are expected to register with the state’s Jabatan 
Agama Islam, or Department of Islamic Affairs and Administration, in order to obtain 
their official Muslim status. Together with their name, picture, ethnicity and other 
personal particulars, the individual’s religion is stated as an item on their official 
identity card.  Thus, religious conversion implies not only the subjective embracement 
of an alternative set of beliefs, but is also the likely transformation of personal 
practices – in diet, dress and social networks.   
 
 Change of membership and performance of rituals alone, however, do not 
comprise the whole of religious conversion. As suggested by Snow and Machalek 
(1984), the relationship between membership and conversion is tenuous. People can 
become members of a group, but do not participate in activities or are not committed 
to the group. Also, dramatic events such as the conversion rituals may occur out of 
emotion and they do not guarantee authentic and enduring inner change.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
for new converts to Islam or as spiritual rejuvenation after a personal crisis or loss. The hajj links 
pilgrims with Muslims around the world symbolically, ritually and politically. (Esposito 2003:105) 
7
 In Islam fasting is required during Ramadan, the ninth month of the Muslim lunar calendar, during 
which all Muslims are required to abstain during daylight hours from eating, drinking, or engaging in 
sexual activity. Through heightened awareness of their bodily needs, Muslims come to greater 
awareness of the presence of God and acknowledge gratitude for God’s provisions in their lives. 
Abstinence during Ramadan is required of all Muslims, except children, those who are ill or too elderly, 
those who are traveling, and women who are menstruating, have just given birth, or are breast-feeding. 
In such cases, one may make up days of fasting at a later time. (Esposito 2003:83)  
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 As stated by Keith Roberts, religious conversion refers to a process of ‘turning 
around’ or changing direction in life, and specifically refers to a change of world view 
specially. While it often is viewed as a sudden crisis, the process can also be a gradual 
one. Yet in any case, conversion represents a transformation of a person’s self image 
(Roberts 1990). Religious conversion is also defined as a process of ‘reality 
reconstruction’ (Straus 1976) which includes a ‘reorganization of identity and 
meaning’ (Travisano 1970). The reorganization of identity created by conversion 
occurs along several dimensions with varying consequences and implications. Thus, 
embracing the convert’s role, which is one of the rhetorical indicators suggested by 
Snow and Machalek (1984), serves as an important indicator for us to define religious 
conversion. ‘The convert not only “introjects” the convert role and sees himself or 
herself in terms of that role, but that it influences the convert’s orientation in all 
interactive situation’ (Snow & Machalek 1984:174). To pass as a convert, the 
individual needs to know not only how to talk like a convert, but also how to behave 
like a convert and how to look like a convert (Kilbourne & Richardson 1988:10). 
Passing as a convert is an important concern for a new convert. As the converts’ new 
identity as a convert is produced through this narrative and performance, it is 
important to also consider the convert’s audience who, through their part in the 
conversation and their responses to the convert’s performance as a convert, help to 
shape the convert’s new identity and sense of self.  
 
 During the process of religious conversion, Chinese Muslim converts undergo 
a reconstruction of religious identity as they are becoming new members of a 
religious group. As the new identity of the ‘convert’ is produced through the convert’s 
narrative and performance, it is important to consider the convert’s audience who, 
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through their part in the conversation and their responses to the convert’s performance 
as a conversation, hopes to shape the convert’s new identity and self. According to 
Wimberely (1989), member of a religious group expect that each individual member 
will perform certain normative religious behaviors and adhere to certain normative 
religious beliefs. That is, a particular kind of role performance. In different religious 
groups, the shared expectation for followers includes such norms as belief of that 
particular religion, the doctrines, the holy text, the divine, rituals and some modicum 
of knowledge about one’s faith. This aspect of religiosity may be termed religious 
norm adherence, defined as the degree to which an individual adheres to the 
normative expectations of his or her religious group. This is to say, religious norm 
adherence is the degree to which an individual’s role performance is consistent with 
the shared expectation which make up that role. This is even more particular in the 
case of conversion to Islam, which serves not only as a shift of beliefs but also an 
adoption of a way of life. The five pillars of Islam serves as the foundation to Muslim 
life, guiding their spiritual life, what they can eat (consumption of pork, alcohol and 
non-halal food is not allowed), and what they wear (men and women are required to 
wear proper attire according to the Qur’an). 
 
 Religious boundaries are established in the process of constructing the new 
religious identity. It comprises those aspects of the respondents’ life which ensure that 
the individual is identified both by themselves and others as a member of the religious 
group. The religious boundary owes its clarity and pervasiveness to the nature of the 
religion. In the case of Islam, boundaries are based on its teaching place upon rightful 
action. This emphasis upon action means that to be a devout Muslim, one must 
behave in certain explicitly defined ways. Therefore, a Muslim is obliged to express 
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his/her belonging to the Muslim community. Becoming a Muslim resulted in a change 
of identity at both a personal and public level. Religious oriented action that brings 
significant changes and influence day-to-day interaction between Muslim and non-
Muslims serves as the significant religious boundary. These actions include the 
changing of name, belief, practice and habits with new understanding of the doctrine 
of Islam. These changes provide a structure of daily routine for the converts to 
maintain their new identity in the post-conversion period, to make it workable as their 
commitment flourishes in this structure. 
 
Identities Adjustment and Negotiation in the Post-conversion Period 
 Berger & Luckmann (1967) describes the conversion process as a 
conversation with significant others, through which the individual co-creates and 
actively appropriates his social world. The social world (with its appropriate 
institutions, roles and identities) is not passively absorbed by the individual but 
actively appropriated by him’ (1967:18). The very reality of the individual’s world 
depends upon this conversation. ‘If such conversation is disrupted (spouses die, 
friends disappear, or one comes to leave one’s original social milieu), the world 
begins to totter, to lose its subjective plausibility’ (1967:17). In the case of religious 
conversion, conversation in one social milieu may be replaced by conversation in 
another, as the individual’s transforming social world (including the aforementioned 
institutions, roles and identities) is co-produced by the individual and his newly 
significant others. However, this change should not be exclusive.  
 
 Religious conversion may bring in new significant others to the converts’ new 
social world, but it does not mean that they have to give up their ‘old social world’ 
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completely. Identity formation is a continual process. The sustaining and modification 
of identity, established by social relationships and processes, is to a large extent a 
determinant of social structures (Jones 1978: 60) But as Peter Berger & Thomas 
Luckmann has said, this is a dialectical process in the sense that such identities do act 
upon the social structure.  For instance, for Chinese Muslim converts, new significant 
others such as their Muslim counterparts may play an important role in shaping their 
religious identity in the post-conversion period. However, pre-conversion institutions 
(e.g. family), roles (e.g. son/ daughter in family) and identity (e.g. being Chinese) that 
are part of the convert’s social world prior to conversion, still form part of the social 
structure for the converts after conversion.  
 
As suggested by Wimberely (1989), the greater the salience of one’s religious 
identity, the greater is one’s propensity to adhere to religious norms rather than 
conflicting norms linked to other roles in a given situation. The hierarchy of salience 
is posited by Stryker (1980) to be consequential for behavior when two or more sets 
of social relationship are simultaneously relevant and thus invoke multiple identities 
for a single situation, a condition of ‘structural overlap’ it may be that the behaviors 
called for by these different identities are compatible with one another. But when 
these behaviors are incompatible, the hierarchy of salience influences the choice of 
behavior. In short, in order to classify one’s religiosity, it is about how strong that 
identity ‘over-rule’ the other aspect of self, the more dominated one’s religious 
identity of one self, the higher is one religiosity. In the context of Malaysia, where 
situation is that the expression of religious identity is embedded with ethnic 
characteristics, the issue becomes more complex. In the situation where Chinese 
Muslims interact with the Chinese counterparts, their salience of Muslim identity 
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decreased. This situation corresponds to Stryker (1980)’s arguments on why one 
might give precedence to one identity over another identity in deciding how to behave 
in a given situation. If a person has a high degree salience towards a particular identity, 
violation of norms affiliated with that particular identity forces that individual to face 
a great deal of cognitive dissonance. As a result, identity adherence depends on the 
situation and on when and who a person is interacting with.  
 
 As suggested by Garfinkel (1967), sense-making is the beginning of 
everything that is possible in the social world. The same set of rules and norms that 
guide or inform the production of action, also guide or inform reasoning about action. 
Since these rules are shared and accountable, people can consolidate the idea that 
reasoning actors use rules to make sense of one another and hold on another to 
account. Also, members of society have all kinds of background knowledge about 
people and circumstances that we employ and take account of in our dealings with 
them and that is what we use to typify or normalize our view of everyday events. 
People’s actions reproduce social facts and social institutions. For instance, ethnicity 
as an ascribed identity to Chinese in Malaysia that most people take for granted. 
However, in fact their ethnicity is something that they achieve and re-achieve, from 
moment to moment across their entire lifetime. In the same process, they also 
dynamically achieve and re-achieve ethnicity as a massive, omnipresent social 
institution. To develop a ‘coherent self’ in the post conversion period, Chinese 
Muslim converts do not establish their new understanding of self merely based on 
their newly obtained religious identity, because their ethnic identity (one of the core 
identities) plays an important role too. Commitment following conversion often forms 
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a sociological bond in a community. However, it does not mean that converts have to 
cut off their ties with their prior community.  
 
 According to my respondents’ experiences, one of the common problems that 
the Chinese Muslim converts share is the hostility towards their conversion from their 
families. The reason why their families are often against their conversion is because 
they are afraid that converts will be disconnected from the family and the larger kin-
group as they have to maintain new identifications after conversion such as a change 
of name, new lifestyle, food, habits and so on. However, according to the 
respondents’ account, most of them do not think that there are any contradictions 
between being a Muslim and being Chinese. In Malaysian society, there is deep 
cognitive dissonance when Chinese become Muslims. For Chinese Muslim converts 
themselves, however, taking up a new religious identity does not mean that they have 
to give up their ethnicity. And yet, the hostility from their family towards their 
conversion serves as the major motivation for them to reconcile the conflict between 
the ethnic and religious identities. The family is the ‘professed reason or accounts of 
their motivations or impetus for change’ (Gecas 1986). It is because of the family 
hostility and the social pressure that they have to actively show that they are 
becoming Muslim yet remaining Chinese.  
 
In the process of attaining a new religious identity yet maintaining their ethnic 
identity, Chinese Muslim converts constantly negotiate with the others on their 
identities boundaries. These negotiations mostly take place under the structure of 
daily routine in the post-conversion life. For instance, after embracing Islam, they still 
participate in Chinese festivities, yet do not take part in rituals deemed to contradict 
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their new beliefs. Furthermore, they purposely maintain their Chinese surnames when 
they are asked to change to Muslim name after conversion. For the married converts, 
this can also be shown in how they pass their surnames onto their next generation. 
Moreover, Chinese Muslim converts use history and beliefs to make connections 
between Chineseness and Islam, in order to construct a ‘legitimate ground’ of being 
simultaneously Chinese and Muslim for themselves and others.  
 
 In the next chapter, I look at the history of ethnic relationship in Malaysia as 
the social context for Chinese Muslim converts situated in.  
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Chapter 3:  The Social Context and Conversion Process 
 
 In this chapter, I would like to illustrate the ethnic relations in Malaysia as a 
background to understanding the social circumstances that the respondents are 
situated in. Chinese Muslim converts are often considered something of an enigma in 
Malaysia as they are always being discriminated by both Malay and Chinese 
communities (Ma 1996). The social context of ethnic relations in Malaysia can help 
us to understand why this is the case. Secondly, I will discuss the official boundaries 
that exist to differentiate the Chinese and the Malays in Malaysia, and which define 
the status of Chinese Muslim converts in the state system. This section aims to 
illustrate how Chinese Muslims are systematically prevented from ‘becoming Malay’, 
which contradicts the stereotype of Chinese converting to Islam in order to obtain 
Malay status. Lastly, I will illustrate the reason why the respondents decided to 
convert to Islam. I hope to provide a more comprehensive understanding on the 
motives of their conversion, which is the basis upon which Chinese Muslim converts 
are often discriminated. Also, I will highlight which social factors and significant 
others are playing an important role in shaping the respondents’ identity. This chapter 
provides as an account of how the respondents orient themselves in relation to the 
socially defined group identity.  
 
The Malaysia Context: Ethnic Relations in Malaysia 
 Malaysia is a multi-ethnic, multi-religion society composed of three major 
ethnic groups – Malay, Chinese and Indian. According to the national census in 2000, 
65.1% of the total Malaysian citizens are bumiputera (Malay), 26% are Chinese and 
7.7% are Indian (Department of Statistics Malaysia 2001). These ethnic categories, 
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which were first constructed by the British colonial government, became a social 
norm, although each of these categories share a common flaw in the fact that they 
never represent a homogenous group of people but comprise of many other sub-ethnic 
groups (see Tan 1982). Furthermore, like many other postcolonial nations, ethnic 
identities became a critical agenda in the national politics during the post-
independence period. Ethnically based political parties, including the United Malays 
National Organization (UMNO); the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the 
Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), are formed to govern the nation. 
 
The Malay and Chinese are the two largest ethnic groups in Malaysia. 
Conflicts between these two groups make up an important part of the country’s 
history. Tensions between these two groups are driven mainly from the unequal 
distribution of economic and political power. Economically, since the Malacca 
Sultanate period, the Chinese played an important role in the trading between China, 
Southeast Asia and India.  During the colonial period, Chinese not only played an 
important role in the entrepot trade (Yen 2000), but also invested in the tin industry, 
rubber plantation, and other cash crop agriculture. According to Phang (2000), at the 
time of independence in 1957 the Chinese earned more than other ethnic groups 
mainly because they were engaged in the more productive sectors in the economy.  
The Chinese were dominant in the industries where the returns were much higher, 
such as the commerce, mining, manufacturing and construction industry. Although 
the average monthly household income per head for Chinese are generally higher than 
Malay and Indian over the period from 1970 to 1997, the gap between Chinese and 
Malay households were consistently decreased (Phang 2000: 113). Most importantly, 
as indicated by Phang (2000), within the middle 40 per cent of households, the growth 
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in income of bumiputeras and Chinese was similar. The disparity was mainly a 
reflection of the differential in the income growth of the top 20 per cent and the 
bottom 40 per cent of households. 
 
Politically, during the British colonial period (1874 - 1941), the British 
administrators in Malaya generally tended to be pro-Malay rather than pro-Chinese 
(Comber 1983:10). It was the official British policy to preserve the use of the 
indigenous forms and institutions of the Malays and to be solicitous of their views, in 
keeping with the philosophy that colonial rule was a form of trusteeship for Malaysia, 
with the British acting as an ‘umpire’ mainly to keep the alien Chinese at bay and to 
look after the special interests of the Malay. When the British entered into treaties 
with the Malay rulers, they recognized the principle that the ‘special rights’ of the 
sultans and their Malay subjects must be protected (Comber 1983:11). Although 
Chinese had organized themselves politically and militarily to liberate the country 
from external forces during the Japanese Occupation period (1941-45) and the post-
war anti-British movement, they were not supported by the large Malay population as 
the Malay leadership ‘questioned the loyalty of the entire Chinese population toward 
their adopted motherland’ (Lee & Heng 2000:20). Also, the attempted collaboration 
between the organized Chinese Chambers of Commerce and the Malay political 
parties during the post-WWII period to counter the proposal of establishing the 
Federation of Malaya under the British influences was proved ineffective. In 
particular, the Chinese representatives strongly objected the demand of Malay leaders 
that Malayan citizens be called ‘Melayu’ for fear of losing ‘racial individuality, 
culture and independence’ of Chinese in Malaya (Lee & Heng 2000:199). Eventually, 
the British promoted the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), a Chinese 
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conservative party, as the representative for the Chinese political interests and it co-
operated with UMNO to form a ruling alliance. However, during the process of 
negotiation during the nation’s independence, works such as constitutional 
arrangement had been mainly done between the British, UMNO, and the sultans 
(Harding 1996). The character of the Federation was thus markedly Malay. It 
safeguarded the constitutional status of the sultans in the Malay states, highlighted the 
special positions of Malays, and imposed stricter citizenship conditions on non-
Malays (Lee & Heng 2000). The Malaysian Constitution formulated in 1957 based 
Malaysia’s national identity on the Malay language and culture, including the practice 
of Islam, and protected the special rights of Malaysia’s ‘son of the soil’ (bumiputera). 
While Malay serves as the national language of Malaysia and all citizens are expected 
to learn it in school and Malay culture is a vibrant concept that is difficult to define, 
Islam became the most significant ethnic characteristic of the Malay and the 
distinguishing boundary between Malay and non-Malay.   
 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the government imposed a series of polices to 
enhance the economic achievement of Malay. Many quasi-government bodies and 
organizations were set up to enhance the economic performance of the Malays as a 
consequence of the series of pro-Malay policies initiated by the British High 
Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya in 1952. According to Phang (2000), these 
organizations such as Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) and Majlis 
Amanah Ra’ayat (Council of Trust for the Indigenous People) (MARA) provided 
various supports, especially funding, to Malay peasant for their production 
advancement and to Malay businessmen for setting up new business. All these 
initiatives and policies seriously undercut the benefits for the Chinese and Indian, 
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particularly those who used to have effective control over agricultural land belonging 
to Malays and domination in certain industries such as public transportation. Also, the 
ethnic-based rural-urban segregation, in which the Chinese were concentrated in the 
three major towns of Peninsular Malaysia including Kuala Lumpur, Penang and Ipoh, 
was very striking during the 1960s (Comber 1983). As the quality of life, social 
amenities, and economic opportunities seemed to be better in Chinese majority urban 
areas than in Malay majority rural areas, the urban-rural economic imbalance began to 
be interpreted in racial terms. While the Malays concentrated in the traditional rural 
sector of the economy, the modern urban sector of the economy was dominated by 
non-Malay and foreign companies. Thus, the government set a target that at least 30 
per cent of the management and ownership of all commercial and industrial activities 
should be in the hands of the bumiputeras (Heng and Sieh 2000). It was the first time 
in the history of Malaya that such a major readjustment and restructuring of the 
economy had been proposed, and the ripples of the policy inevitably increased the 
tension between the Malays and the Chinese.  
 
 In terms of cultural and education policies, the government initiated campaign 
on the wider use of Malay language created the pressure of cultural suppression to the 
Chinese community. The National Language Act passed in 1967 confirmed that 
Malay as the sole national and official language, although English was still permitted 
to be used for some official purposes. The outcome was that non-Malays were 
decidedly unenthusiastic about the government’s stand on language, especially as they 
realized that the planned unification of the school system would lead to Malay 
becoming the sole medium of instruction (Comber 1983). 
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With the accumulation of tension between the Malay and Chinese interests, 
conflict erupted between these two largest ethnic groups in the ethnic riots on 13 May 
1969 in Kuala Lumpur.  The riots were acknowledged by the Malaysian authorities to 
be the most serious racial riots in the history of the country (Comber 1983: xv). The 
Alliance of UMNO, MCA and MIC lost large number of seats to opposition parties in 
the 1969 election. The Alliance faced the prospect of a strong Chinese-based 
opposition in parliament for the first time since it had come to power. The situation 
was seen by the Malays to be extremely serious. On 11 and 12 May, the opposition 
parties Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) 
held ‘victory’ parades in Kuala Lumpur, which were followed by numerous smaller 
processions. On 13 May, a group of UMNO supporters organized a counter-
demonstration. Immediately after this procession, rioting occurred in various parts of 
Kuala Lumpur. Malay and Chinese indulged in an orgy of killing, looting and burning. 
Hundreds or people either lost their lives or wounded and thousands of people lost 
their home (Comber 1985:71). 
 
In 1970, the government acknowledged that the riots were caused by ‘ethnic 
polarization and animosity’ (Comber 1985:74). Based on this explanation of unequal 
economic status between the Malay and the Chinese as the cause of conflict, the 
government implemented a series of ‘affirmative action policies’ such as the ethnic 
quota system for tertiary education. The New Economic Policy (NEP) which 
restricted Chinese corporations and provided preference to Malay-owned corporations 
in with regards to government projects, the Malaysian government successfully 
promoted the privilege status of Malay, who are considered the ‘bumiputera’ or ‘son 
of the soil’, which also implies that they are the ultimate owners of Malaya.  
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 It is under these social circumstances that Chinese Muslim converts are further 
stigmatized in Malaysian society. Due to the ethnic political struggle, Chinese 
converting to Islam is not only a personal decision of religious choice, but also a 
political issue. Previous studies indicated that the main reason why Chinese Muslim 
converts were discriminated against is their motive of conversion was suspected by 
the Malay and Chinese community (Ma 1996; Chuah 2001). Two major forces are 
responsible for this situation. On one hand, Islam is manipulated for the construction 
of Malay identity during the nation building process. On the other hand, in response to 
the ethnic discriminating policies, Malaysian Chinese began to fear cultural loss and 
assimilation. Many of them turned to organizational strategies and ideologies of 
popular religious culture, including ancestor worship, Taoism, Buddhism and 
Confucianism, as a source of strength and cohesion in the 1970s and 1980s 
(DeBernardi 2004). Malaysian political scientist and activist Chandra Muzaffar 
observed with some alarm that religious polarization had become ‘the new channel, 
the new conduit for transmitting ethnic fears and insecurity’ (Muzaffar 1984:124). 
Noting the visible heightening of non-Malay religious consciousness, A. B. Shamsul 
observed that ‘the significance of the religious factor in Malaysian politics has 
reached a level of intensity never before witnessed’ (Shamsul 1994:113). 
 
 One of the stereotypes of Chinese Muslim converts is that they converted to 
Islam based on ‘convenience and opportunism’ (Long 1989). It is suspected that 
Chinese who converted to Islam are not really sincere about the religion but do so in 
order to obtain certain benefits. Overlooking conversion as a religious behavior, some 
believe that the Chinese converted to Islam in order to get married with Malays and 
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that they will not really practice the religion. However, as suggested by Ma (1996), 
with the economic growth during 1980-1990s and the halt of NEP in 1990s, the 
economic factor could no longer serve as an attraction for Chinese to obtain Malay 
status. Also, there were only a small number of cases reported from the religious 
department that Chinese Muslim had received subsidy from the government (Ma 1996: 
89). Furthermore, conversion does not guarantee any ethnic status change in the state 
system. Institutionally, converting to Islam does not mean that a Chinese can become 
Malay or obtain the bumiputera status.  
 
Institutional Boundary – Conversion to Islam in Malaysia 
 Islam is the official religion in Malaysia, as recognized in the Malaysian 
constitution. The position of Islam is found in Article 3 which states ‘Islam is the 
religion of the Federation, but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony 
in any part of the Federation’ (Jusoh 1991:32). Islam served as the fundamental 
source of nationalist movement during the post-independence period and the most 
influential component for the construction of Malay identity. The government did not 
hesitate to promote Islamic values in its domestic and international policy 
implementation; however, it was only in the 1980s when Islamisation of the state 
bureaucracy took place. Inherited from the colonial traditions, religious matters in 
different states are administrated and governed by its Sultan. Thus, different states 
may have different Islamic laws and implementations. In 1970s, the Prime Minister 
set up the Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (Department of Islamic Advancement 
Malaysia), or JAKIM, to coordinate Islamic issues in the country and promote 
nationwide propagation and ‘advancement’ of Islam.  
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 As far as Islam is concerned, it is a complete way of life comprising all aspects. 
This means that all activities have been laid down in accordance with Islamic rules. 
Thus, unlike the case in most of other countries (especially the West) that are strongly 
influenced by the notion of secularization, the conception of separation between the 
religious sphere and political sphere is absent in Islam. Religion is not only a personal 
matter but the matter of the community. Thus, registration with the government is 
important for a Muslim convert to obtain their ‘official status’ as a Muslim. Citizens 
in Malaysia have to carry an identity card, which states their name, ethnic group and 
religion. Moreover, Islamic rituals are basically administrated by the state. For 
example, according to Islamic law, the marriage of a non-Muslim8  remains valid 
when both parties embrace the faith of Islam at the same time or one of the parties 
follows the other to embrace Islam before the end of the period of legal retirement. 
Otherwise separation takes place immediately. Also, an institutionalized Muslim 
identity is important for Muslim to fulfill their religious obligation such as payment of 
zakat; organizing pilgrimages to Mecca; marital status registration under the Islamic 
marriage law; matters related to the Shari’ah Court which have the legal power over 
all Muslim in the country. This is particularly the case for a Chinese convert, who, in 
the eyes of the majority Malay-Muslim community, are apparently not Muslim. 
 
 The administration of Muslim matters is subject to the authority of the ruler in 
the state, the Sultan. In the case of Selangor, the official body for administrating 
Muslim affairs under the state government system is the Jabatan Agama Islam 
Selangor (Department of Islamic Affairs and Administrations Selangor), or JAIS.  
                                                 
8
 In Islam, a Muslim man is allowed to marry a kitabiyyah – which means ‘a woman who is Christian 
or Jewish by faith, and not but virtue of birth into a Christian or Jewish family’ (Fahmy 2001). 
However, according to Gabriel (2000), kitabiyyah is expected to convert to Islam in the case of 
Malaysia and this Islamic law ‘as applied in Malaysia actually goes beyond the sharia in matters of 
marriage of a Muslim to a kitabiyyah woman’ (p.119).  
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There are different divisions in the department to administrate different aspects of 
Muslims affairs. It is the Division of Dakwah, or preaching, which responsible for 
propagating Islam. The division provides support, counseling and many other types of 
assistance for new converts.  
 
 Other than the government official body, Islamic-oriented organizations and 
Islamic-oriented non-governmental organizations (IONGOs) also play an important 
role in the process for new converts to acquire their Muslim status. These 
organizations include:  Persatuan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (Malaysian Islamic 
Welfare Organization), or PERKIM; Malaysian Chinese Muslim Converts 
Association, or MACMA; and Islamic Outreach of Angkata Belia Islam Malaysia 
(ABIM, Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement), or ABIM. Some of these organizations, 
such as PERKIM and MACMA, are financially sponsored by the government. Islamic 
Outreach ABIM (IOA) is an IONGO that had not received any government support. 
However, all these organizations formed a network so that they can refer converts 
who have different needs to each other. These organizations offer religious classes for 
public who are interested in Islam; providing peer-network support; and assist 
converts to go through the ‘complicated’ registration procedure. Here is a list of 
services and classes that are provided by these organizations: 
 
Table 3.1 Services Provided for Chinese Muslim Converts by Islamic 
Organizations 
Organizations Services Provided for New Converts 
PERKIM Courses on basic about Islam conducted by Malay, English 
and Tamil, weekly during weekdays;  
Counseling services for conversion and marriage; 
Assist new converts to go through the registration with 
JAIS, application for financial assistance for Muslim and 
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etc. 
Publications about Islam in Chinese, English and Tamil 
MACMA Courses on basic about Islam conducted by English and 
Chinese, weekly during weekdays; 
Counseling services for Chinese converts 
Regular gathering, celebration of Chinese festivals among 
Chinese and non-Chinese Muslims;  
Islamic Outreach ABIM Convert’s Development Program including Beginners 
Class (every Sunday), Concept of the Qur’an, Al-Fitrah 
Program, Ahlan Wasahlan Program, Arabic Class, Prayer 
Class, and Learn how to read the Qur’an for Beginners. All 
courses are conduced in English.  
Counseling services for new converts; 
Pre-marriage course counseling for Muslims; 
Assist new converts to go through the registration with 
JAIS 
 
 JAIS seldom serves as the initial point of contact for new converts. Ma (2002) 
suggests that although there are religious counseling services provided in the Jabatan 
Agama Islam, their service is apparently ‘not friendly’ towards new converts. This 
point is confirmed by most of my respondents. Some of them report unpleasant 
experiences during encounters with officers of the Jabatan Agama Islam. Of eighteen 
respondents in this study, ten indicated that NGOs were their initial point of contact 
with Islam.  All respondents, regardless of their first initial point of contact with Islam, 
eventually completed their official registrations as Muslims through NGOs.   
 
Fareed’s (55, converted for 20 years) 9 experience illustrates another example 
of the barrier from the personnel responsible for the conversion process.  
 
‘There were some problems [when I tried to register]. It was a problem 
with people more than the process of registration. I still remember that 
                                                 
9
 Throughout the thesis, pseudonyms are given to replace respondent’s real name in order to protect 
their privacy. First number in the bracket represent respondent’s age at the time of interview (in 2003), 
follow by the number of years they had converted.  
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Imam10 in the National Mosque……my friend brought me to see him in the 
Masjid (the National Mosque).Me and my friend were both working in the 
public work department at that time, that is why we knew each other. My 
friend told the Imam about my background and that I wanted to register as 
Muslim. Before we sit down and I started to talk with the Imam, 
straightaway, he asked me in Malay, “do you know that by becoming 
Muslim you cannot eat pork?” I think it is really rude. My friend was also 
upset, they told me don’t worry and that this Imam had some problem. It is 
not correct for an Imam to ask such question. The second question that he 
asked me was ‘You [want] to become Muslim because you want to get 
married?”. I said no, it was not my intention at that time……He did 
register for me but he questioned me a lot with improper questions.’ 
 
 The official procedures for becoming Muslim in Malaysia include two steps: 
the religious ritual and the formal registration. The religious ritual entails recitation of 
Shahadah in front of two male witnesses. After that, new converts fill out a form, 
either provided by JAIS, or the organization which they affiliated with, for the 
registration of their new Muslim status.  
 
 I observed two conversions during my fieldwork at Islamic Outreach ABIM. 
Converts were accompanied by their friends to IOA and they recited the Shahadah, 
led by a voluntary teacher who teaches the Sunday Islam Beginners’ class every week. 
Afterwards, they were required to fill out the registration form11 provided by IOA. 
Converts were required to fill out their personal particulars.  The form had to be co-
                                                 
10
 The leader of worship in mosque.  
11
 See Appendix I 
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signed by the witness, the person who led the conversion, and the person who was 
responsible for bringing the convert to the IOA. A temporary Kad Islam12 ,which 
serves as Muslim identity card, will be produced by IOA and can be used until the 
official Kad Islam is issued by the religious department. The Kad Islam bears the 
convert’s photo, name, Islamic name, place of conversion and date of conversion. In 
this process, most converts have to face a critical question about whether they want to 
change their name or not. It is important to note that converts are not allowed to 
change their ethnicity after their conversion. Converts’ name after conversion; gender; 
date of birth and their ethnicity are indicated on Kad Islam. After their Muslim status 
is obtained, converts are able to change their name as it appears on their other official 
documents such as identity card and passport. However, there is no way for converts 
to change their ethnicity as it appears on their official documents. 
 
 Like Christianity, Islam is a religion that flourishes through converting non-
believers. Theoretically speaking, conversion should be welcomed. The Malaysian 
government plays an active role in the preaching of Islam, for instance, setting up 
Dakwah institutions under PERKIM. It shows that at the state level, conversions are 
welcomed. However, at a personal level, the situation may not be the same. In some 
ways, the unpleasant experiences with the government officials, who are usually 
Malays, affect my respondents’ attitudes towards their ethnic and religious identity in 
the post-conversion stage.  
 
                                                 
12
 See Appendix II 
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 Yaman (33, converted for 10 years) shared his unpleasant experience with me 
about his registration of Muslim status when he came back to Malaysia, after he 
converted for three years in the UK while he was studying there.  
 
‘At first I went to the religious department in Johor Bahur. I talked with a 
person there and told that I was a Muslim already and just want to 
formalize it. So I met one Ustazah13 there. At that moment……I don’t know, 
maybe she don’t like my face or something else, she was not very happy 
with me. She asked me what Muslim name I will choose. When I converted 
in the UK, people told me all the time that “you don’t have to change your 
name”. In Islam, you are not required to change your name at all. In fact, 
that is what I still believe, there are nothing to deal with Islam and change 
my name [there are correlation between believing in Islam and changing 
my name]……I told her that I don’t want to change my name. And then the 
Ustazah look very surprised. She said that if I was sincere about the 
religion, I will change my name. She was accusing me that I am not very 
sincere! And I was very angry! I was converted and practiced Islam when 
I was in the UK. I strongly believe in Islam and she was wrong! She 
doesn’t know me and she accused me because I don’t want to change my 
name. I decided to walk out, which I did.’  
 
 After the first unpleasant and humiliating experience, Yaman gave up his 
attempt to register his Muslim status until he met another Ustazah in a mosque, who 
abetted him in the registration process.  
                                                 
13
 Learned Muslim, or religious teacher 
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 ‘This time the Ustazah is more understanding. He asked me the basic 
question about Islam and other basic articles about Islam and what are the 
five pillars of Islam. And then he recited Shahadah for me. He was 
convinced that I was in Islam. So then he issued a letter under the letter 
head of the religious department of Johor Bharu, which supervised that 
who, so-and-so, has formally registered with the religious department [i.e. 
to formalize his Muslim status]. He also sent a circular letter that was 
passed around religious departments in Malaysia which, stated that 
converts should not be forced to change name.’  
 
Process to Conversion 
Religious conversion is a complex and on-going process; it is impossible to 
name one particular incident that is solely responsible for one’s conversion. Social 
context may help us to understand certain reasons why Chinese convert to Islam. 
However, it should not serve as the only basis in explaining the phenomenon. In fact, 
during the process of conversion, there is usually more than one motif that exists. It is 
important to examine the circumstances leading up to conversion, particularly in the 
case of Chinese Muslim converts, because their stereotyped motivations of conversion 
– out of convenience (in order to marry Malay) and being opportunists (in order to 
obtain privilege status of bumiputera) – are often reasons why they are being 
marginalized.  The following section will focus to how the respondents look at their 
motives of conversion. 
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 The converts who participated in this research span a wide range of 
backgrounds regarding their former beliefs and practices. Among the eighteen 
respondents studied, ten reported that they were raised following their parent’s 
religious practices such as ancestor and idol worship; three were Buddhists; four were 
Christian converts before they converted to Islam; one had converted to different 
religions including Buddhism, Taoism and Hinduism before converting to Islam. Ten 
respondents, mainly Buddhist and Christian converts, reported that they were 
practicing their religion prior to conversion. Six reported being nominal, weak or 
disillusioned with their religion. Two claimed no religion or were not interested in 
religion at all before they converted to Islam.  
 
Table 3.2 Distribution of Converts’ Religious affiliation before Conversion 
Religious Affiliation Number of Converts 






 For those who had no religious commitment for a long time or described 
themselves as nominal in their religion of origin, conversion meant a religious 
intensification through a different religion. Consider the case of Fatima (45, converted 
for 14 years),  
 
‘I was Buddhist before I converted to Islam, even though I don’t really 
know what Buddhism is. I just followed my family and worshiped. So, 
when I found out about Islam which only believes in one god, it makes me 
feel so special. So I catch up more and learn more about Islam, and get to 
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know the beauty of Islam. Then I learnt about prayer and fasting and it 
became my faith. I read most of the things from Qur’an and the holy book 
guided me a lot.’  
 
 For those who had strong religious commitment before conversion, their belief 
in God served as one of the impetus for their conversion to Islam. Lutfi (22, converted 
for 1 year) said: 
 
 ‘I believe that if I had not studied the Bible again when I was in Form 6, I 
will not go to Islam……. When I looked back, if God did not introduced 




 In discussing the conversion process to Islam amongst native Britons, Ali 
Kose (1996) adopted Lofland-Sknovd’s mode of conversion motifs to examine the 
case of converts to Islam. This model could also help us to understand the case of 
Chinese Muslim converts in Malaysia. Lofland & Skonovd (1981) offer six types of 
conversion (intellectual, mystical, experimental affectional, revivalistic, and coercive) 
characterizing each using five independent elements: 1) degree of social pressure; 2) 
temporal duration; 3) level of affective arousal; 4) affective tone of conversion 
experience; and 5) the belief-participation sequence. They characterized each 
conversion motif by a particular profile in terms of these variables. They also noted 
that these major types occur at different times and with different frequencies, 
depending on the social and historical content. When this model is applied to the 
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present sample, it indicates that Chinese Muslim converts primarily go through three 
conversion motifs: intellectual, affectional and experimental. 
 
 The intellectual motif was found in eight cases. Other motifs like affectional 
and experimental also played a role in their conversion, but these subjects said that 
their initial skepticism about their previous beliefs, and their intellectual discovery of 
Islam preceded their conversion.  In the intellectual mode of conversion, the 
individual becomes acquainted with alternative ideologies and ways of life by 
individual, private investigations such as reading books, watching television, and 
other impersonal ways. Though some individuals convert themselves in isolation from 
any actual interaction with devotees of the respective religion, in intellectual mode the 
individual is still likely to be socially involved with members of the new religion. 
However, where there is little or no external social pressure, the process does not take 
long and a reasonably high level of belief is attained prior to actual conversion. 
Lutfi’s case is a good example to illustrate this: 
 
‘Since I was young, I always believe that there is God. However, at that 
time, I don’t know which God is true – whether Jesus in Christianity or 
Allah in Islam. When I was in secondary school, I always spent my 
vacation with my father’s side relatives who are Christian. Sometimes I go 
to Sunday school with them and from that point I considered myself as 
Christian. I go to church very often as there is a Methodist Church in our 
school, although I still have a lot of confusions with Christianity. For 
instance, there is a part in the bible about the Satan and Jesus. The Satan 
said to Jesus that “Bow to me, worship me and then I will give you the 
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world”. If Jesus is God, he created everything – he created richness, the 
world and the Satan! How come Satan who is being created can offer 
richness to God? This is not logical. Also, if you look at the bible 
nowadays, it had been modified a lot and, because of the problem of 
different languages, a lot of parts are being misinterpreted. Furthermore, 
one of the main problems with Christianity is that there are too many 
different schools of thought but no standardized law. When I finished 
secondary and waiting for the beginning of new semester in university, I 
went to Kuala Lumpur and took up a summer job there for four months. 
While I was there, I went to different churches as I do not have specific 
attachment to any of them. I realized that in different church, different 
parts of the Bible are being taught and they have different guidelines for 
life. In Catholic church, they talk about trinity – the father, the son and the 
mother Mary, but then, in Protestant, they talk about the Holy Ghost.’ 
 
 During his first semester at university, Lutfi had taken a compulsory module14 
on Islam civilization. He then had a better understanding on Islam. Having all the 
confusions and misunderstanding on Christianity, he started to feel that the teaching 
in Islam is more convincing. 
 
‘When I learnt about Islam in the course, I found that in Islam there are 
five basic beliefs – to believe in God, in one God; to believe in angels; to 
believe in the book of last time and the last book, which is the Qur’an; to 
believe in the prophet; and to believe in the last day of judgment. The 
                                                 
14
 In June 1997 a government ruling made Islamic civilization a compulsory subject for all university. 
According to Gabriel (2000), ‘there were widespread objections from non-Muslim communities who 
saw this regulation as a subtle attempt to propagate Islam among non-Muslim’ (p.104).  
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teaching is clear and there is also five pillars on what a Muslim should do. 
Everything is much clearer and logical than Christianity. Islam is much 
more convincing.’ 
 
 The affectional motif was present in all eighteen respondents. Their personal 
contact with Muslim friends or acquaintances whose opinions or behaviors are valued 
played a role in their conversion. In the affectional mode, personal attachment or 
strong liking for practicing believers is central to the conversion process. Though 
social pressure is present, it functions more as a ‘support’ and an attraction, rather 
than as an ‘inducement’. The process is relatively prolonged. Even if the central 
experience is affection, the ordinary level of emotional arousal seems more in the 
range of ‘medium’ intensity, and as in experimental conversion belief arise out of 
participation. From the experience of my respondents, two main social factors played 
a significant role in encouraging their conversion to Islam, as reflected from the 
respondents’ case. Firstly, schools, especially the national type school, serve as the 
first point of contact for many Chinese converts about Islam. Secondly, Malay friends 
who are Muslim play a significant role in influencing their decision to convert. 
Sherman (29, converted for 11 years) converted to Islam when he was studying in 
secondary school regardless of his family’s disapproval: 
 
‘Most of my friends in schools are Muslim. Through them, I had a chance 
to know about Islam. Sometimes they will show me books about Islam too. 
I think I was kind of lucky because most of my friends are very good. They 
set up a good example for me. I thought that it is the religion that makes 
them good people. I am from a Buddhist family, however, I had never 
 55 
thought about or committed in any religion before. I think I was a free-
thinker at that time. However, since I keep in touch with my Muslim 
friends, I started becoming interested in religion. I read a lot about Islam 
and discussed a lot my friends. After a year or so, I decided to convert.’ 
 
 No matter what reasons or motivating factors they had for their conversion, 
the majority went through a period of experimentation during the process. In this 
mode, the potential convert takes an experimental ‘show me’ attitude and is ready to 
give the process a try. The prospective convert participates in the group’s ritual and 
organizational activities and learns to act like a convert. It involves relatively low 
degrees of social pressure to participate since the recruit takes on a ‘try it out’ posture. 
The actual transformation of identity, behavior, and world view takes place over a 
relatively prolonged period. Belief arises out of participation. Sixteen respondents 
came to Islam after studying or spending a considerable amount of time among 
Muslim friends and families. As well as getting information and impressions from 
Muslims and reading about Islam, they also visited mosque, attended meetings 
organized by NGOs such as PERKIM and MACMA and even joined the prayers and 
try it out for themselves.  
 
 Fareed recollected how he was involved with Islam before his conversion: 
 
‘Before I convert, I already had some basic knowledge about Islam, 
mainly from school. I remember that I did fast with my schoolmates during 
the Ramadan when I was in secondary school. At that environment, since 
everybody is doing it, it is not so difficult. So, I always have to idea of 
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becoming Muslim, it is not that strange for me to convert. It’s just the 
matter of time.’ 
 
 The convert may undergo two or more types of conversion motifs at the same 
time or at different time during the process leading up to actual conversion. However, 
an overview of the lifespan and the accounts of conversion experiences give clues 
about the primary conversion motif. The converts appear to have been under the effect 
of two or three motifs rather than just one. 
 
 Apart from judging the conversion patterns that converts went through, 
respondents were also asked to identify the most motivating factor for their 
conversion. As illustrated in Table 3.3, the most popular reason of conversion, as 
reported by the converts themselves, was being convinced by the religious doctrines 
and teaching of Islam. It was followed by friends or relatives’ influence and marriage 
with Muslim.  
 
Table 3.3 Distribution of Respondents’ Motivating Factors of their Conversion 
 
Motivating Factor Number of Converts 
Convinced by the religious doctrine and  teaching of Islam 9 
Attracted to the moral ethnical standard 1 
Friends/ relatives’ influence 4 
Marriage with Muslim 4 
Total 19 
 
 Interpersonal bonds, including marriage, and social relationships seem to have 
played a significant role in the conversion process. Apart from the fact that it is 
compulsory for non-Muslim to convert to Islam in order to marry Muslim and 
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officially, many studies on religious conversion have shown that spouses are often 
instrumental in inducing the individual to convert (Salisbury 1969; Mayer 1987). 
Thus, although marriage might serve as the primary motivation for their conversion, 
commitment to the religion at the cognitive level has the potential to be established 
afterwards.  
 
Conversion through Marriage  
 Eleven of the present sample were married or engaged (two engaged) to a 
Muslim at the time of interview. Of them, five converted to Islam before they met 
their spouse and marriage was not the initial reason for their conversion. Six 
converted before marriage in order to be able to marry their existing or future spouse. 
This research does not claim to ascertain the scale of conversion to Islam in Malaysia 
for the sake of marriage. Undeniably, as indicated by other studies (Edmonds 1968; 
Ma 1996), there is possibility that there are people whose primary motive of 
conversion was to marry a Muslim and they do not practice the religion. However, no 
such cases were found in this research project. Also, I would like to illustrate that 
although marriage could be the primary motivation, as illustrated above, it is possible 
to go through more than one motif during the conversion process. The cases of 
Hassan (42, converted for 14 years) and Muna (36, converted for 8 years) are the best 
examples. Their initial reason for conversion was both because of marriage with their 
Malay spouse and they did not really believe in or practice the religion at the 
beginning. However, through time, they both become a devout Muslim. 
 
 Hassan converted because he married his Malay wife. He confessed that he 
did not really practice the religion at the first three years after his conversion until he 
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met a Malay friend who questioned his Muslim identity. He is currently an active 
member in one of the Islamic organization for converts.  
 
‘Honestly, before I converted to Islam, I did not have much understanding 
about Islam and not interested in it. I only have a very general 
understanding about Islam, such as Muslims are not allowed to eat pork; 
they are required to pray in mosque etc.  My initial reason of conversion is 
marriage. Before marriage, I went through a conversion course and form 
then on I have a better understanding about Islam. Since then, my attitudes 
towards Islam changed’ 
 
 Although marriage is the initial reason for conversion, Hassan mentioned that 
it is his Christian background helped him understand and accept Islam. 
 
‘I was a very devoted Catholic before I converted to Islam. When I was in 
secondary school, which is a Catholic school, I used to attend the church 
services everyday after school and teach in one of the Sunday school. So 
when I attended the conversion course, I was surprised that Islam also 
talks about prophets such as Moses, Jesus and Abraham. That’s one of the 
reasons why I was getting more interested in knowing about Islam. 
However, in the first three years after conversion, I did not really practice 
the religion. It took me three years to really commit into Islam. During this 
period of time, I made a lot of observations. From what I was taught from 
the course in PERKIM and how people practice the religion, I know that it 
is a good religion. But I just didn’t see any reason why that I should 
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commit myself. It is until when I met this Malay friend when I made a 
business trip to my hometown.  He asked me if it is sufficient to be a 
Muslim by just following the rituals such as praying five times a day and 
don’t eat pork. I said that is very good enough because everyone is doing 
it. But he told me that it is not enough. A true Muslim has to practice and 
to believe in what he or she is practicing. I thought a lot about what he 
said and I went back to do some more readings about Islam, and then I 
realized the linkage between knowledge and the divine for the matter or 
worship in Islam, which is very unusual in other religion.’ 
 
Hassan also described his beginning of commitment in Islam in a religious 
manner:   
  
‘I call the three years as exposure period which varies from different type 
of people. Some people may receive the message before the conversion 
then they want to be a Muslim, but it may take some years for other people. 
In Islam, we call it Hidayah, in which a total commitment came about from 
it. This Hidayah comes from the divine, from the great power up there. It is 
a choice given to us. Since we are the best of the creations, we are given 
choices and the ability to choose. However, it is still very much depends on 
our heart, whether we want to accept it or not.  
 
 Muna converted because of her marriage with a Malay businessman from 
Indonesia. She was a devoted Buddhist before and she still practiced Buddhism even 
after conversion. However, it was not until her marriage had problems that she started 
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to seriously learn about Islam in order to fully understand and perform the duties of a 
Muslim wife.  
 
‘In 1995, I was converted. Actually, after 1995, I still practice Buddhism. I 
read a lot of books about Buddhism and my husband did not reject it. He 
also read my books. He did not teach me any thing about Islam. Between 
1995-2000, I had a lot of problems with my husband and eventually I 
asked for divorce. During that time, I started to query Islam. All I know 
about Islam is from husband. He is a Muslim, and all his behavior 
represents Islam to me. I start to think about what’s wrong with the 
religion because my husband’s behavior is not moral. I query Islam and I 
dislike it. Then, I started to read about Islam as I think that maybe I had 
not met the Islamic standard to be a good wife. I brought a book called 
‘How to be a Muslim Wife’. After I read the book, I felt that I met 90% of 
the requirement. And then, I’ve brought another book called ‘How to be a 
Muslim husband’ and I found that it is him who did not meet the 
requirement. Since then, I became more interested in Islam.’ 
 
 She remains as a Muslim after her divorce. After the divorce, she had 
experienced some major crisis in her business and the incident made her more 
interested in looking Islamic ways of life especially economic sphere. She was 
attracted to the moral ethic standard of the religion.  
 
‘During that incident [crisis in business], I feel really helpless, especially 
when I just divorced at that time. I started to look for help from God and I 
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read the Qur’an regularly. I found that a lot of principles mentioned in the 
Qur’an can prevent all the social problems. Qur’an is the ‘rule of God’ for 
human being to follow and there are ways to ensure fairness. I’ve studied 
economics and laws for 20 years. However, after studying the Qur’an for 
just two years, I found that it actually included almost all the knowledge I 
had studied before. If we use Islamic rules, there will be less conflicts and 
problems in the society……In Chinese we say ‘business and cheating is 
not separable’. But in Islam, which encourage business, it does not say in 
this way. For example, if I have money and you have not, you want me to 
invest in your business. Of course I should have some control over 
company… I believe that Islamic rules are the truth and the cures for our 
society.’ 
 
Concluding the Chapter 
 Historical ethnic tensions between Chinese and Malay community explains the 
reason why Chinese conversion to Islam is a sensitive issue in Malaysia. Since Islam 
was manipulated for the construction of Malay identity during the nation-building 
process, a strong ethnic connotation of Islam is established. For the Chinese 
community that fear of cultural loss and assimilation under a series of ethnic 
discriminating policies, converting to Islam is equal to converting to Malay culture 
and betraying their own traditions. Chinese Muslims’ motives of conversion were 
suspected in the eyes of their Chinese and Malay counterparts. Since marriage is one 
of the major reasons for conversion to Islam, it is assumed that Chinese conversion to 
Islam is convenient and not sincere. It is often misunderstood that Malaysian Chinese 
convert to Islam to obtain bumiputera status, which provides them with special 
 62 
privileges under the New Economic Policy.  However, after understanding the 
institutional boundaries of the Islamic identity which are constructed and maintained 
by state agencies, converting to Islam does not mean changing ethnicity in the 
institutional sense. In fact, the purpose of establishing this boundary is to distinguish 
the Malays from other ethnic communities, not to provide the opportunity for other 
ethnic groups to cross into the Malay category.  
 
Yet, stereotyping of Chinese Muslims who converted to Islam as individuals 
doing so to obtain Malay status still persists. It is based on several reasons. Firstly, the 
general public is not familiar to the administrative procedures that the converts must 
go through. Usually people will not encounter the issue of changing name, religion or 
ethnic identification and thus they do not know about the rules and regulations on 
those issues. Secondly, the arbitrary treatments that respondents received from the 
Jabatan Agam Islam Selangor demonstrate that rules and regulations are not 
implemented uniformly in the government agency. Also, since the Jabatan Agama 
Islam has different set of rules and regulations in different states, it is difficult for 
people to have a coherent understanding on fact that Chinese Muslim converts are not 
able to change their ethnic status institutionally.  
 
 In order to better understand the reason for Chinese conversion to Islam 
inspite of the many difficulties, we should understand religious conversion as a 
complex and on-going process. As we can see from the experience of the respondents, 
there are several motifs for their conversion. In many cases, there are multiple motifs 
responsible for their conversion to Islam. Although marriage may be the initial reason, 
intellectual motifs such as a changing attitude towards religion, changing world view, 
 63 
and affectional motifs such as friends’ influences also play a role in different stages of 
the conversion process. Since religious conversion is not a single event but an 
ongoing process, we should not simplify this complex process by indicating a single 
reason for conversion. The reasons for conversion demonstrate the social 
circumstances within which Chinese Muslim converts are located and certain critical 
factors that make their conversion possible, and furthermore, their struggle to 
maintain both their ethnic and religious identities as separate categories after 
conversion.   
 
 In the chapters which follow, I shall be looking at the ethnic and religious 
identities of my respondents, to try to understand the ways in which these identities 




Chapter 4: Identity Construction and Adjustment after Conversion 
 
 Investigators of conversion seem virtually unanimous on the idea that 
conversion involves a radical change in one’s identity, belief, ideas, values and 
personality (Travisano 1970; Gillespie 1991). Conversion from one religion to 
another means changes that involve large areas of personality and these vary 
according to the religion itself. The decision to change one’s religion forms the basis 
which enables converts to view life from a different perspective. The changes caused 
by conversion fundamentally transform the convert’s conception of the world and 
changes their perception of the universe of discourse. At the same time, in order to be 
acknowledged as part of the religious community, Chinese Muslim converts are 
expected to adopt the ascribed characteristics of being a Muslim including the way 
how should they interact with the others (Muslim and non-Muslim). Thus, becoming 
Muslim results in a change of identity at both the personal and public levels.  
 
 Establishing religious boundaries is the way to attain the ascribed 
characteristics of being Muslim. The boundaries comprise those aspects of the 
respondents’ lives which ensure that the individual are identified both by themselves 
and others as members of the religious group. These boundaries owe their clarity and 
pervasiveness to the nature of Islam, more particularly, its teachings which place 
importance on orthodoxy of action. This emphasis upon action means that to be a 
devout Muslim, one must behave in certain explicitly defined ways through 
appropriate religious behavior.   Furthermore, Islamic prescriptions for action do not 
only relate to the ‘religious’ sphere of life. Rather, they involve all aspects of social 
existence: even the mundane activities that fill a day can and should be permeated 
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with religious meanings. Thus the social difference that distinguishes an observant 
Muslim from non-Muslim tends to be demonstrated in normal interaction and on an 
ongoing basis, rather than merely from time to time. 
 
 However, as discussed earlier, Islam is strongly associated with the Malay 
ethnic identity in Malaysia. Chinese Muslim’s explicit behavior associated with Islam 
is always being understood as betrayal to their ethnic traditions. In the case of Chinese 
Muslim converts in Malaysia, the dilemma between the ethnic and religious identity is 
always an issue. Thus, certain negotiations and adjustments have to be made while 
converts try to obtain their new religious identity yet remaining Chinese. 
 
 In this chapter, I discuss the construction of religious identity of Chinese 
Muslim converts in the post-conversion period. To understand the process, it is useful 
to look at the religiously oriented actions that bring significant changes and influence 
the day-to-day interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims. First, the change of 
name symbolizes the very first step of changing identity of converts in a public 
manner. It represents a public announcement of one’s entering the Muslim community. 
Second, the change of belief, practice and habits – including the formal practice of 
Islamic rituals, observation of Islam’s dietary laws and prohibition of alcohol – are 
likely to have an effect upon pattern of interaction between Muslim and non-Muslim. 
Third, understanding the doctrine of Islam, according to my respondents, is an 






 Religious groups require their new members to change their formal identity by 
adopting a new name which is a way of fostering higher involvement through external 
identity symbols and stronger identification with the group (Beit-Hallahmi 1989:101). 
In Islam, adopting a new name at the time of conversion signifies a new beginning of 
converts’ life. Converts are ‘typically given Muslim names as a sign of conversion’ 
(Esposito 2003: 228). It is because one’s Muslim name is given according to certain 
guidance in the traditions of Islam. As indicated by Hughes (1965), a Muslim usually 
has a name that accords with the teaching of Muhammad. The teachings include: (1) 
the best name to use is Abdullah (i.e. servant of God); (2) name children after the 
prophet (i.e. Mohammad); (3)  a proper name that does not over-exaggerate the ability 
and power of one person, etc. (Hughes 1965). Thus, it is common for converts to 
adopt an Islamic name in order to fit with these guidelines. However, changing names 
is not compulsory unless the existing name poses a negative meaning such as 
blasphemy. 
 
 Converts who registered their Muslim status with the Jabatan Agama Islam 
Selangor (JAIS), or Department of Islamic Affairs and Administration of Selangor,  
used to be required to either 1) adopt an Islamic name (e.g. Mohammad Chan Tai 
Man) or 2) change their name completely by putting ‘binte Abdullah’ (for female, i.e. 
daughter of the servant of God) or ‘bin Abdullah’ (for male, i.e. son of the servant of 
God) at the end of their new name (e.g. Mohammad Chan bin Abdullah) to signify 
their convert identity. However, according to an interview with a JAIS officer, in 
2000, the National Registration Department had allowed Muslim converts not to 
change their name and retain their old name (e.g. Chan Tai Man) on their official 
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documents. They can identify their religion as Islam but their race should remain as 
Chinese on their identity card. Converts are not obligated to change their name 
officially for conversion. Nevertheless, due to the ineffective implementation of this 
policy, some of my respondents, who converted in 2001, told me that officers from 
JAIS still asked for their Muslim name when they went to register their Muslim 
status15. In this research project, all, except one, respondents had registered their 
Muslim status and provided an Islamic name as part of their official record. However, 
they have different attitudes towards using their Islamic name in daily life, something 
I discuss later. 
 
 Due to the significant role of the surname in Chinese traditions, changing 
one’s name is a ‘sensitive issue’ for Chinese Muslim converts. According to Ebrey, 
the Chinese family name is central to ‘the notion of ancestors and marriage: ancestors 
shared one’s surname; marriage partners did not’ (Ebrey 1996:12). Family name is 
much more important than personal name and it is important for both personal and 
group identity. The Chinese family system is rooted in Confucian thinking about the 
largest ‘we-group’ and it allows people to trace back their ancestry, by passing the 
family name from the father’s side (Ebrey 1996).Ma (1996) quoted Lee How Lan’s 
studies on the inter-ethnic marriage between Chinese and Malay in Malaysia that 
‘Chinese parents are especially angered at a son changing their family name, because 
this would mean that their family name would cease to appear in the following 
generation’s name’ (Ma 1996). Sherman illustrated this issue when he says: 
 
                                                 
15
 The details on the inefficiency of the implementation of policy in religious department about 
converts’ issues had been discussed in detail in Rosey Ma’s 1996 thesis on the problem that Chinese 
Muslims are facing. 
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‘[My family] thinks that I decided to convert and change my name as a 
symbolic action to signify that I cut off the relationship with them 
immediately.’ 
 
 According to the respondents’ accounts, I found that there were three different 
responses towards the issue of changing names. The first group of respondents, 
consisting of four converts, had very strong feelings about the issue. At the time of 
registration, they resisted when they were asked to change their name. Although they 
had registered the Muslim status with their Islamic name, in their daily life after 
conversion, they only use their Chinese name to identify themselves. 
 
 Ong (38, converted for 8 years) had registered his Islamic name with the 
Jabatan Agama Islam Selangor when he converted. He did not want to do this but at 
the time when he converted it was compulsory under the religious law in Selangor. 
However, he had never used his Islamic name in daily life and now he only uses his 
Chinese name on his business card and for publication. He explained: 
 
‘I am working in an Islamic NGO and people at work all know that I am a 
Muslim. I have published in some newspapers for a long time already and 
sometimes I even give talks to the public about Islam. My Muslim identity 
is well-known and I do not need to use an Islamic name to make it clear.’ 
 
 Han (25, converted for 4 years) had registered his Islamic name with the 
government but regretted having done so, stating: 
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‘It is compulsory [to change my name when I converted]. But now I regret 
it. I regretted that I changed my name. It is not just about the name, 
[conversion] is not about what name you use. What important is in your 
heart and your knowledge. Now I regret it. Now I use my Chinese name in 
my formal daily life ... although I lost my identity card once, but I didn’t 
put my Islamic name [on it] because I wanted my Chinese name on my 
identity card. If I change my name, my parents will find out…. It is still 
better to use my Chinese name because I am a Chinese, I don’t want 
people thinking that I am becoming Malay or something like that.’ 
 
 Sara (25, converted for 2 years) had registered an Islamic name when she first 
converted. However, she reverted to her original Chinese name when an officer from 
the Jabatan Agama Islam requested that she changed the name on her official 
documents including identity card and passport to her new registered Muslim name, 
and she refused to do so. Nowadays, she uses her Chinese name to identify herself 
most of the time. She explained during the interview:  
 
‘[When I introduce myself], I use my Chinese name. But if they are 
Malay … they usually try to question a lot. Sometimes … it is very funny, 
because in Islam, we only change our name if the name brings bad 
meanings. But they don’t know. It is like [once you convert] you have to 
change your name. So I just tell them my Islamic name, and then they will 
not question too much.’ 
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 Lee (42, converted for 10 years), who converted because of marriage, had not 
changed her name on any official document. Since her marriage was registered 
overseas and she felt that religion is a personal matter, she did not register her Muslim 
status with the Jabatan Agama Islam in Malaysia. Currently, she only uses her 
Chinese name in daily life. 
 
 For the second group of respondents, although they expressed discontent at the 
way in which they were requested to change their name by the authority, at the same 
time, they believed that it was ‘natural’ for a convert to adopt an Islamic name upon 
conversion. Because of this, they tended to use their Islamic name in daily life. 
However, because of the social pressure of presenting themselves in Islam way 
symbolize that they had ‘gone over to the Malays’ (Nagata, 1978), they consciously 
retained their Chinese name as part of their new name. This group, consisting of ten 
respondents, is a good example to demonstrate the dilemma that Chinese Muslim 
converts have to face in the frustrating situation of changing names after conversion. 
 
 Yaman converted when he was studying overseas. When he came back to 
Malaysia, he wanted to legalize his Muslim status so he went to register with the 
Jabatan Agama Islam. However, he had a very bad experience with the officer in the 
department who questioned him about his Islamic knowledge, his sincerity to Islam 
and requested him to change his name to an Islamic one. He was angry with the 
imposition of the changing name policy, although he was willing to adopt an Islamic 
name. He explained: 
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‘I want my parents to know that I am not becoming Malay. I’m [Muslim] 
but I’m still a Chinese. I refused to wear Malay clothes.… I refused to look 
or act likes Malay because I want to quote to my parents that ‘I’m not 
Malay, I’m still Chinese and Muslim’. That is what I want to prove; that’s 
the principle for me. Because of that problem with the officer, I didn’t 
want to change my name. But I did change my name in the end. Now, I 
don’t regret it, I don’t mind to have a Muslim name. I just don’t want 
people to think that I have become Malay…. I did change my name on my 
identity card, so I introduce myself with my Muslim name. I don’t call it a 
Malay name because it’s a Muslim name. I don’t mind having that name. 
In fact, I prefer people to call me by my Muslim name, more than a 
Christian or English name because it will cause confusion. But if a convert 
comes to me and says that “I don’t want to change my name”, I will say, 
“That’s OK, don’t change your name”.’ 
 
 Lutfi, whose conversion was concealed from his parents at the time of 
interview, did not want to change his name on his identity card because he did not 
want his parents to misunderstand that he would give up his Chinese identity. 
However, generally, he likes people to call him by the Islamic name that he had 
chosen at the time of conversion, explaining, 
 
‘It is a very good name, [it] has a very good meaning. I’d like people to 
call me by this name and I hope that one day I will be a person like that, [a 
person with good characteristics as the name described].’ 
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 The third group, with five respondents, had not resisted or felt bad when they 
were asked to change to an Islamic name upon conversion and registered with the 
authority. Since converting to Islam, they only use their Islamic name to identify 
themselves in daily life.  
 
 Aishah (23, converted for 4 months) was willing to adopt an Islamic name, 
although no one in the Jabatan Agama Islam asked her to change her name when she 
registered:  
 
‘They didn’t ask me to. Somehow, I felt ready to choose a Muslim name … 
have a Muslim name, have an Arabic name, for the good meaning, why 
not?’ 
 
 Fatima faced dilemma between family pressure and her personal preference 
for an Islamic name: 
 
‘My father was not very happy with it actually. He said “I gave you a 
beautiful name, why [do] you want to change it?” But then it was the 
government’s law, you see, whoever becomes Muslim has to change the 
name. Then I told him, “Never mind, I changed my name but I still put my 
surname there, the ‘Lee’, the surname is still there.” … For me, it is OK. I 
become a Muslim, I make my own identity. When people look at me they 
know that I’m Muslim. It’s good to be identified as Muslim. I’d like people 
to call my Muslim name.’ 
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 Fareed shared the same opinion that an Islamic name provided him with a 
stronger Muslim identity. He explained: 
 
‘[Changing name] is something natural, nobody said anything about that 
[in the registration]…. I took it as something natural that when I become 
Muslim, I will have a Muslim name. Nobody specifically said that I need to 
have a Muslim name … if not I would be no different with any Chinese 
who is not Muslim. I want my Muslim identity to stand out from the name.’ 
 
 It is found that the respondents’ diverse opinions on this issue were very much 
related to their families’ attitude towards their conversion. For the respondents in 
group one, they all had experienced strong opposition from the family against their 
conversion. For Ong and Sara, their conversion was unknown by their family. But for 
the respondents in group Three, their conversion was generally accepted by their 
family, or at least, there were no strong opposition towards their decision.  Although 
family factors may not be the sole force that shape respondents’ attitudes, as we can 
see in group Two, there are cases from both sides (with and without family support) 
but they still tended to identify themselves with their Muslim name. However, at least 
one point was substantiated from the respondents’ accounts – that family is the main 
reason why respondents consciously maintain their Chinese name or struggle with 
adopting an Islamic name. 
 
 There is lack of evidence to show that respondents’ various responses towards 
changing name is related to how long they had been converted and their religiosity. 
Although Group One respondents tend to not using their Muslim names, it does not 
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necessarily means that they are less salience towards their religious identity. For 
instance, during my three meetings with Sara, who did not use her Muslim name in 
daily life, she always wears proper Muslim attire with loss-cut long sleeves clothing 
and wearing head scarf. Also, she is pursing a graduate degree in Islamic family law 
and being very active in the activities organized by the converts’ organization. Ong 
was working at an Islamic organization at the time of interview and he had been 
involved in the dakwah of Islam for more many years. He was active in sharing his 
experience as Muslim and the teaching of Islam among Chinese communities through 
publishing in Chinese newspaper and giving seminars to Chinese audiences. Although 
he never used his Muslim name to introduce himself, his Muslim identity is, as he 
described, ‘well-known’ among his community of both Chinese and Muslims.  
 
 
Change: Beliefs, Practices and Habits 
 Inter-faith conversion is primarily concerned with changes in the contents of 
faith. The converts involved in this study, by the act of pronouncing the Shahadah 
upon conversion, accepted the oneness of God, and the Prophet Muhammad as His 
last messenger. For those who were Christian before they converted to Islam, the idea 
of Jesus being God or the Son of God was dropped and the doctrine of the Trinity 
abandoned. Converts now believe that Jesus’ and Muhammad’s mission are in 
essence the same. Islam means finding the end of the line started by the Prophet 
Abraham, not rejection of the Christian tradition. Conversion for them is a total 
renunciation of their former religious tradition. Furthermore, they found that what 
they had learned from their previous religion helpful in understanding Islam. However, 
for those who had been raised in Chinese Religion in which the concept of ‘One God’ 
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was absent, or was not committed into religion before they converted, their cases were 
much more different.  
 
 Chinese Religion in Malaysia refers to the complex set of beliefs and practices, 
in which combines Chinese folk religion with elements of Taoist and Buddhist 
traditions as well as Confucian ethnics. Tan (2000) describes Chinese Religion in the 
following manner: 
 
‘There is no standard ‘holy book’ which provides a coherent and 
comprehensive religious ideology and ethics, many Chinese deities are 
actually associated with ethnical teaching while Confucian ethics are 
generally regarded by worshippers and organized religious group as 
important…religious participation involves worshipping at home and in 
temples. The worship is primarily concerned with propitiating for peace, 
security, and prosperity as well as for specific ritual needs such as healing 
the sick and appeasing the dead…there is indeed a wide range of shen 
(deities) and temples for the worshippers to choose from. There are 
‘universal’ deities which are worshipped by most Chinese...not only 
among Chinese Malaysian but also among Chinese worshippers world-
wide…there are [also] a host of other less universal but powerful 
deities …are popularly invoked during spirit-medium session, for they are 
‘know’ for using their supernatural power to exorcise evils, heal sickness, 
and give divine protection…some deities are associated with certain 
Chinese dialect groups…[there are also] some which are of local 
Malaysian or Southeast-Asian origin…Chinese Religion is polytheistic. 
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The deities are not a haphazard collection of gods and goddesses. They are 
loosely organized in Chinese thinking into a hierarchical relationship’. 
(Tan 2000: 283-290) 
 
In terms of religious practices, converts expressed that they did not in general 
find them difficult. Since most of them went through a period of preparation before 
their conversion, their commitment into religious practices followed easily when they 
formally accepted Islam. However, no matter how much they felt they were prepared 
to commit themselves, some aspects still remained hard to digest and observe since 
Islam brought a lot of restrictions to them. But in general, they committed themselves 
to observe these restrictions. As Sherman said:  
 
‘There are a lot of restrictions in Islam, for example, we are not allowed to 
drink alcohol. I believe that these restrictions are good. It helps me to 
develop in a good way, making me a better person and to avoid bad 
influences.’ 
 
 In terms of daily prayer, eight respondents pray five times a day; six pray at 
least once a day; three pray at least once a week; two pray occasionally. Thirteen 
respondents fast throughout Ramadan every year since converting to Islam; five 
generally fast on-and-off over the course of the month. Converts interviewed also 
practice the ‘don’ts’ of Islam faithfully. All respondents declared that they had not 
consumed any alcohol and non-halal products since conversion. Five of them never 
drank alcohol even before converting to Islam. 
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 Gender differences appear in regards to the change of clothing in the post-
conversion period. Women presented more difficulty than men. Of the twelve men, 
only three of them mentioned about changing dressing style. It is because in Islam 
women are required to cover their body and hair. At the time of interview, three out of 
six women wore scarves and Baju Kurung16, a dressing style popular among Malay 
Muslim.  
 
The other three, although they did not wear any scarves, wore clothes with 
long sleeves and high necks, and skirts that covered their knees. For Muna, wearing a 
scarf was difficult at the beginning but she eventually adopted it.  
 
‘I didn’t wear the scarf for some years after my conversion. However, most 
of my friends wear it. Actually, I found that quite beautiful as you can 
match it with your clothes. So, I brought few of them. But I dared not wear 
it. At the beginning I just tried to wear it in home when no one was around. 
You know, I was afraid that people would look at me strangely on street. It 
was until one day, when without reason I was trying on the scarf at home.. 
When I looked at the mirror, I suddenly had this feeling of relief. The 
feeling is like you wrap your favorite book to protect it. I knew then that 
the time had come so I started to wear the scarf anywhere I go everyday.’  
 
 Dressing styles often serve as important settings, ‘which supply the scenery 
and stage props for the spate of human action played out before, within, or upon it’ 
(Goffman 1959:22). In terms of expression of identity, it is an especially visible and 
                                                 
16
 Baju Kurung for women comprises a long-sleeved loose fitting long blouse worm over a matching 
sarong 
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literal marker of difference. In the context of Malaysia, clothing serves as a boundary 
to differentiate between Chinese and Malay groups, although in a cosmopolitan area 
like Kuala Lumpur, Western clothes are commonly worn by both Malay and Chinese. 
However, as suggested by Goffman (1959), an appropriate setting as a part of social 
performance is important. Otherwise the actor cannot perform their social role in the 
way that the audience expected them to do so. Sara’s experience is a good example: 
 
‘The day when I was talking with my aunt, she said “why you wear long 
sleeves and you don’t wear skirt?” I can’t say much, you can tell from her 
face [that she wanted to say something]. Then she said “you don’t look 
like Chinese anymore”. I asked “why? How come?” The way you dress is 
not the only [thing that represents who you are]…. I am still Chinese…my 
blood, my face, all Chinese, everything.  And I can speak Chinese. They 
said they just know that I am not Chinese anymore. I was thinking why 
they have such mind set …… why they don’t complain [about] those who 
are so keen to learn English and those who don’t even speak 
Chinese?.......they think that [they way how you dressing is] more 
important, you must dress and talk like a Chinese. And they will say that if 
you dress like this [wearing head scarf], you are not Chinese anymore’   
 
 With cultural hybridism existing in Malaysia nowadays, there are no 
significant social norms on what Chinese and Malays should or should not wear. 
However, the problem that Sara was facing is that because her audience (her auntie) 
felt the mismatch of the setting, which is the clothes she wore, and her performance as 
a Chinese member in the family.  
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 Yaman had made the similar statement when he talked about how he didn’t 
want his parents to consider his conversion as equivalent to becoming Malay. 
 
‘I refuse to dress and talk like a Malay; when I go to mosque I just wear 
this, I don’t wear songkok17.’ 
 
 Malay traditional clothing such as Baju Kurung is the kind of clothing which 
is more commonly worn by Malay women than Chinese women in daily-life, 
although, it is also worn by Chinese women in some public formal occasions. For 
Malay males, it is common for them to wear the songkok, especially for those who 
work in government agencies. As we can see, the ethnic connotation with clothing is 
very strong in the Malaysian context.  While there is no equivalent concept about 
wearing Chinese traditional clothing in order to be more Chinese, ‘not dressing like a 
Malay’ is the way a Chinese is expected to dress. In this sense, we can see that when a 
Chinese Muslim tries to wear a headscarf (for female) and a songkok (for male), 
which is part of the Islam culture but commonly understood as Malay culture in 
Malaysia, such an act is a symbolic one that indicates that s/he is ‘not being Chinese’. 
 
Learning Activities 
 In studying religious conversion, a question which may be raised is whether 
converts are more committed to Islam than life-long Muslims. In fact, as other studies 
have indicated (Nagata 1978; Ma 1996), this is one of the reasons why Chinese 
Muslim converts are facing difficulties when they deal with their Malay-Muslim 
                                                 
17
 Songko is a headgear worn by Malay Muslim for religious and ceremonial purposes  
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counterparts. It would be difficult to answer this question as it very much depends on 
personal piety. But from my research, I find that the Chinese converts seem to be as 
committed to Islam and take the religion as seriously as many life-long Muslims Your 
sentence is too rhetorical – how would you know when you had not studied life-long 
Muslims? This observation lends support to Beit-Hallahmi’s (1989:100) proposition 
on who in light of psychological theories distinguished two different kinds of 
religious involvement: ‘one is the low-involvement religion, the religion of identity, 
learned within the family of origin and having little emotional significance’ and the 
other is ‘the high involvement religion, often the religion of converts, who learnt it 
outside their family of origin and invest much emotional energy in it.’ It is found that, 
from my respondents’ experiences, learning about the religious rituals and doctrines is 
a very important means to develop their Muslim identity.  
 
 Islamic teachings are based on the holy book – the Qur’an. Literacy is the 
basic requirement for the believer to practice the religion. Reciting the original text 
from the Qur’an, which is in the Arabic language, is the core part of prayers. The five 
pillars of Islam are the foundation of Muslims’ life. They include: 1) Faith or belief in 
the Oneness of God and the finality of the prophethood of Muhammad; 2) 
establishment of the daily prayers; 3) concern for an almsgiving to the needy; 4) self-
purification through fasting and; 5) the pilgrimage to Mecca for those who are able. In 
order to be able to perform these five pillars, followers are required to understand the 
language and meaning of Qur’an and to know about the rituals of prayer and 
pilgrimage. This knowledge is essential for converts to pass as a convert with their 
Muslim counterparts.  
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 Ma (1996) states that one of the common major problems faced by Chinese 
Muslim converts is that ‘before they are presented with a good knowledge on the 
essence and basic values of Islam, they are made to start learning how to pray, 
memorize verses in Arabic, and are immediately bogged by do’s and don’ts on petty, 
mainly cultural issues’. In her study, she also finds that the Malay community usually 
judges the Chinese converts by saying that the converts are new to the religion and 
their knowledge about Islam is not as good as them. The Malay community is also 
often suspicious of new converts who may live in un-Islamic way because of their 
lack of knowledge about the religion. They treat new converts as ‘second-class 
Muslims’ as they assume that new converts do not know about Islamic teaching as 
good or well as those who were born and raised as Muslim.  
 
 Based on the conversations with my respondents, it is found that they had 
different ways to learn about the doctrine of Islam. One group of respondents (n=4) 
seldom or never participated in classes organized by the government and NGOs like 
Islamic Outreach ABIM, Malaysian Chinese Muslim Association (MACMA) or the 
Muslim Welfare Organization of Malaysia (PERKIM). They learnt about the religion 
mainly from self-reading, family (Malay family, those who married with Malay), 
friends and their individual Imam in mosque. Members of the other group (n=14) 
usually participate in such classes for converts organized by NGOs or the government 
and other activities organized by the Islamic Outreach ABIM, MACMA and PERKIM. 
Additionally, they also acquire knowledge about Islam by reading books on Islam.  
 
 Five respondents had received formal training in Islam at a religious institute 
and/or university. One respondent is furthering her study in Islamic Family Law 
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through a Masters degree. Three respondents had studied at the Dakwah Institute of 
PERKIM18 and had formal training in religious preaching. Two of them had furthered 
their studies overseas on Islamic preaching, Arabic language and Islam theology. 
Another respondent had received his doctoral degree in Islam Theology. 
 
 Among the eighteen respondents, four of them mentioned that one of the 
advantages of being a new convert to Islam was that they were more sincere in 
learning about the religion. Sara (25, converted for 2 years), who was pursing her 
masters’ degree in Islamic law, said that for people who were born as Muslim, they 
usually take things for granted.  
 
‘They may not be interested in knowing about the religion because it is too 
easy for them to have it. But for me, conversion is a ‘rediscovering of 
truth’ which make me have more motivations to learn about the religion. 
Also, I want to have more understanding about Islam so that I can explain 
it to my parents and family about it’.  
 
 For some respondents, learning about Islam and the construction of Muslim 
identities was a response to distrust from the Malay community. Ismail (50, converted 
for 24 years) said that as a convert, he had to study extra hard to prove himself as a 




                                                 
18
 This institute was established in 1962 for the purpose of training converts and non-Malay Muslims 
youth to become religious teachers to serve their respective communities. The institute is also open to 
foreign students. For more information, see the website for PERKIM at http://www.perkim.net.my.  
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Concluding the Chapter 
 Chinese Muslim converts in this study demonstrate their religiosity in terms of 
their salience towards their religious identity in various ways. In this chapter, I 
demonstrate the different ways of how they construct their new religious identity 
through significant changes regarding their habits, their religious practices and their 
involvement in learning about Islamic doctrines. Religious identity for Chinese 
Muslim converts is constructed through the change of name and habits. These actions 
signify their Muslim identity publicly.  
 
 Three different attitudes were found among respondents toward the issue of 
changing their name to an Islamic one after conversion. The first group resisted when 
they were asked to change name at the time when they converted and/or registered 
their Muslim status with the Jabatan Agama Islam and they always used their Chinese 
names to identity themselves after conversion. The second group of converts, 
although they were not happy with the name changing  policy implemented by the 
authority,  felt that it was something ‘natural’ to have an Islamic name after 
conversion in order to signify their change of religious identity. Thus, they tended to 
identify themselves with their Muslim name in daily life. The third group of 
respondents had no bad feeling or whatsoever towards the changing name issue. They 
were happy to adopt an Islam name upon conversion and always used it to identity 
themselves in daily life. The respondents’ different attitudes toward this issue are very 
much related to their family attitude towards their conversion. It is found that the 
stronger hostility a convert faces, the more hesitant s/he is to use their Muslim name 
and the more conscious s/he is on maintaining their Chinese name.   
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 Change of style of dress after conversion is another issue that concerns 
Chinese Muslim converts’ religious and ethnic identity Due to the ethnic connotation 
of Muslim dressing style, wearing a headscarf or proper attire for Muslim by Chinese 
Muslim converts is seen as an act of becoming Malay. Thus it was difficult for female 
converts to decide on wearing the headscarf as they were concerned about wearing the 
‘right’ clothing to maintain their Chinese identity.  
   
 Learning about the doctrines in Islam is an important process of converts’ self-
adjustment to pass as a Muslim convert. During the learning process, the converts 
were not only trying to acquire more knowledge about Islam but also to gain 
acceptance by other members of the Muslim community. For the Chinese Muslim 
converts, they have to work extra hard by studying the doctrines of Islam in order to 
gain assess to the Malay-Muslim community.  
 
In the following chapter, I discuss how Chinese Muslim converts respond to 
negotiate their ethnic identity with their new religious identity. 
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Chapter 5: Negotiating New Ethnic Boundaries 
 
 Upon Islamic conversion, the Chinese Muslim converts also experience 
dilemmas about their Chinese identity. Chinese Muslim’s explicit behavior associated 
with Islam is considered betraying their ethnic Chinese traditions. Their 
‘performance’ as Chinese, in Goffman (1959)’s term, is not fulfilling the ascribed 
characteristics of their expected ethnic role to their peers (fellow Chinese) in a 
consistent manner. The hostility from family towards their conversion serves as one 
of the motives for Chinese Muslim converts to reconcile the difference between their 
expected role as Chinese and the new social identity as Chinese Muslim.  Often they 
have to prove that they have not become Malays and have to make adjustments to 
reconcile their new religious identity and their Chinese ethnicity. In this case, we are 
not looking at the function of ethnic boundaries to distinguish between the ‘we-group’ 
and the ‘other’, but at ethnic relations at the intra-group level. Based on the existing 
structure, ethnic boundaries for Chinese Muslim converts are negotiated and 
reconstructed. This structure includes cultural content that serves to identify ethnic 
boundary markers such as clothing, food and language. The respondents are not 
creating or constructing a new social collective, but simply re-constructing their pre-
existing understanding of what it means to be Chinese. For instance, while changing 
names serves as a symbolic action to signify the very first step of establishing their 
Muslim identity in a public manner, most of the converts expressed special feelings in 
maintaining their Chinese surname after conversion.  
 
Ethnicity is one of the main sources of self-identification for Chinese Muslim 
converts in Malaysia. In this multi-ethnic society, ethnic categorizations are 
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historically and socially constructed. The state and family are two fundamental 
socializing institutions that shape ethnic identity formation. The state plays an 
important role in establishing an ethnic identity for citizens in Malaysia. The official 
boundary between Malay (Muslim) and non-Malay (non-Muslim) is clearly defined 
by the Constitution (Gabriel 2000:42) so that bumiputera (Malay) privileged rights 
and access to resources are protected. Furthermore, ethnic-based affirmative policies 
implemented in the 1950s - 1970s, derived from the history of conflict between Malay 
and Chinese, percolated ethnic segregation to the highest point. At the personal level, 
the family plays an important role in establishing an ethnic identity because it serves 
as the agent to pass on shared history, customs and other components that define the 
boundaries of Chineseness. Furthermore, family members are the closest others that 
the individual can identify with within the ethnic group.  
 
 In the course of religious conversion, Chinese Muslim converts have to face 
the conflict between the newly established religious identity and their existing ethnic 
identity because of the imbrications of religion and ethnicity in Malaysia. During the 
process, family hostility towards their conversion serves as the motivation for Chinese 
Muslim converts to reconcile the conflict between their ethnic and religious identity. 
Commitment following religious conversion often forms a sociological bond in a new 
community, however, it does not mean that converts have to cut off ties completely 
with their prior community. This is particularly the case for the Chinese Muslim 
converts in this study. After converting to Islam, they still regard themselves as 
members of their ethnic community. They are fully conscious and aware of their own 
local environment as well as the universal aspects of the new faith they have adopted. 
More importantly, they see no contradiction between being Muslim and being 
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Chinese. However, since being Muslim is not allied with the ascribed characteristics 
of being Chinese in Malaysia, negotiations have to be made. 
 
 In the first part of this chapter, I will discuss how ethnic boundaries are 
formed in Malaysian society and how the family plays a significant role in the 
socialization of ethnic boundaries. Firstly, I will illustrate the responses from the 
converts’ Chinese family and friends towards their conversion to ascertain the reason 
and what kinds of challenges are imposed on my respondents’ Chinese identity and 
how the negotiation of their ethnic boundary takes place. As one of the significant 
Others in the converts’ pre- and post-conversion social world, the family serves as the 
significant reference group in the process of reconstructing identity. Hostility from the 
family provides the background as to why they needed a regimented schedule or 
structure to maintain their new beliefs whilst retaining their Chinese identity. 
 
In the second part of this chapter, I am going to look at the negotiation 
between their ethnic and religious boundaries. In maintaining their ethnic identity, the 
respondents are not of course creating a new social collectivity, but are drawing upon 
a pre-existing understanding of what it means to be Chinese. In particular, they are 
reshaping the definition of the group upheld by non-Muslim Chinese. The empirical 
material presented in this chapter will demonstrate that my respondents’ ethnic 
boundaries are being negotiated in response to challenges to their ethnic identity from 
their non-Muslim Chinese counterparts. How Chinese Muslim converts adopt new 
sets of guidelines of being Muslim and at the same time perform how a Chinese is 
expected to be is the site to which we can examine the negotiation. Some of my 
respondents attempted to connect themselves to Chinese Muslims in China as a means 
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to find common grounds shared by Islam and the Chinese. They tried to understand 
Chinese identity as a boarder term which is not constrained within the Malaysian 
context, in order to find a way for them to express their simultaneous identity as 
Chinese as well as Muslims.  
 
Boundaries of Chineseness 
 Ethnic boundaries form the bases upon which ethnic groups distinguish 
themselves from other ethnic groups. Boundaries are used to distinguish the ‘we-
group’ from the ‘others’ (Barth 1969). Vivienne Wee’s concept of ‘Chineseness 
implies non-Chineseness’ is useful to understand how ethnic boundaries are defined. 
She described Chinese identity as an ascribed label based on some vague concept of 
culture that is supposedly shared by all Chinese people and that is not achieved by 
oneself. ‘One can either become or un-become Chinese. Chinese identity cannot be 
achieved through cultural change’ and Chinese identity is ‘ancestor-given, ascribed, 
and cannot be easily shaken off, changed or replaced’ (Wee 1988). Thus, no matter 
how diverse it is within the group of Chinese in terms of religion, language and 
custom, they all see themselves as belonging to one ethnic group vis-à-vis Malays and 
other Malaysians.  
 
 However, if we look at ethnic relations at the intra-group level, defining 
Chineseness is always problematic. There has never been a rigid boundary around the 
category ‘Chinese’. In the context of Malaysia, the concept of Chinese in Malaysia 
never represented a homogeneous group. They or their ancestors hail from various 
parts of China with different dialects and different customs. Tan (1997) provides an 
insightful investigation of the construction of ethnic identities among Chinese in 
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Malaysia. He suggests that other than the difference of place of origin among Chinese 
in Malaysia, the level of socialization and localization that the individual received 
also shape their ethnic and cultural identities. Ethnic identity for the Chinese in 
Malaysia is a ‘multi-level and multi-faceted’ concept (Tan 1997). Chinese who 
receive education in different languages (Chinese, English and Malay), speak 
different dialects, come from different places in Malaysia (in relations to the level of 
localization) may perceive themselves as having different cultural identities. 
 
 In the case of Chinese Muslim converts, their self-identification as Chinese is 
often not a problem after their conversion. When respondents replied to questions 
such as ‘Do you consider yourself to be Chinese?’ the respondents’ statements made 
it clear that their ethnic identity survives in the sense that the vast majority of them 
were clear in describing themselves as ethnically distinct from other Muslim 
communities in Malaysia. Of the eighteen respondents, sixteen of them told me that 
they definitely identified themselves as Chinese; two of them indicated that they 
favored the term ‘Muslim’. However, their ascribed source of ethnic identity came 
under challenge because of their act of converting to Islam as they were perceived by 
their family and friends as betraying their ethnic traditions and culture. Thus, in the 
process of conversion explicit behaviors such as their names and their expressions of 
themselves in terms of clothing and way of life became the sites where they negotiate 
and express their new identities as both Muslim and Chinese.  
 
 Objections from family and friends pose as the central challenge to Chinese 
Muslim converts’ new faith and lifestyle expected after conversion. According to the 
converts’ perception of their parents’ attitude towards their conversion, generally 
 90 
there are different levels of objection to their conversion. Generally, parental reactions 
may be classified into three types: 1) those who were hostile or extremely unhappy 
about it; 2) those who were more or less indifferent to the conversion; and 3) those 
who did not take it badly to their daughter/son’s decision.  
 
For type one reaction, the parents felt that their daughter/son had turned their 
back on everything they had given them. Three of my respondent faced this situation.  
The types of reaction from their parents were somewhat varied. Some even 
‘disowned’ their daughter/son. Sherman was born and raised in a rural Chinese family. 
His family practice Chinese Religion but he described that before he had ‘no religion’ 
before he converted to Islam. Although he practiced in offering incense to deities and 
ancestors in ceremonies, he said that he did not fully understand the meaning of those 
activities and he did that because he was told to do so. His parents had a very strong 
reaction when they found out that he had converted although he refused to explain 
exactly how his parents reacted. However, we can get a sense of how strong the 
reaction was from his following comments:   
 
‘After I converted for 3-4 months, my family found out about it. I did not 
plan to tell them that early. In school, only my best friend knew that I 
converted. I guess maybe he had talked about it with somebody and then 
there’s rumor around the school about my conversion. At that time, my 
younger sister studied at the same school so she told my parents about it. 
My parents had a very strong reaction to against it….At that point, I had 
to leave the house and live with my Malay friends. Since then, I have not 
gone back home for almost ten years, although I really wanted to keep in 
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touch with them. I did try to find an opportunity to explain to them about 
Islam, about the conversion…...some of my Malay friends who know my 
family tried to help me to explain to them, and also some officer from the 
religious affairs and administrative department also accompanied me to 
go back home and tried to explain to my family. But my father was really 
stubborn. He really couldn’t accept that and was very angry about that. At 
that point he expelled me from home and asked me not to come back 
anymore’. 
 
 It was not until 2003 that Sherman had reestablished connection with his 
family again. For the first time in the ten years after his conversion, he went back to 
his home town to celebrate Chinese New Year with his family. He described how his 
current relationship with his father and siblings was good but that some relatives 
could not still accept his conversion.  
 
 For Type 2 reactions in which parents were more or less indifferent to the 
conversion, the converts’ did not face extreme reactions from their parents. However, 
these parents did show a certain level of objection or unhappiness with their 
daughter/son’s decision but they let their children continue with what they wanted. 
 
 Yaman converted when he was studying overseas. His mother found out about 
his conversion when she called him and his housemate responded that he was praying:  
 
‘It shocked her because I was not a religious person back home. I told her 
about my conversion and she was very worried. She thought that I might 
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have mixed up my mind or was brainwashed. It takes a while for her to 
adjust.’ 
 
 The third group of parents did not take it badly to their daughter/son’s decision 
or in some way welcome or support the decision of conversion. Three converts’ 
parents fall into this group. They were pleased that their daughter/son found 
something they could relate to. Fatima’s parents were supportive when they know that 
she converted to Islam:  
 
‘My family did not give me much problem. My mother is quite supportive. 
She’s staying with me now and she always wakes up early to cook for me, 
for the Morning Prayer. Even though I’ve told her that it is not necessary, 
during the Ramadan, she will wake up early morning to cook for me as we 
can only eat before sun rise’.  
 
 In another case, Fareed said: 
 
 ‘My family did not respond very negatively. First of all, it is my father 
who decided to send me to Malay school where I learnt about Islam, while 
my other brothers and sisters studied in Chinese or English school…when 
they knew about my conversion, they did not object very strongly or 
violently on my conversion. I was very close with my grandmother, and she 
told me that my mother went to ask a Chinese ‘medium’ if it is good for me 
to become Muslim, and the [Chinese] ‘medium’ said good so she did not 
object my decision’.  
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 Two converts did not have the opportunity to see the reactions of their parents. 
One had lost his parents before conversion and one has been orphaned since a very 
young age. Three converts’ did not tell their parents about their conversion. The 
reason for this was that they predicted their parents would have a strong negative 
response towards their conversion.  
 
 Han’s conversion was unknown to his parents. It is because when his first 
conversion attempt was found out by his parents, they had a strong rejection to it: 
 
‘Since secondary school, I have been interested in Islam…although I was 
not converted yet, I practiced to pray everyday. I would close the door and 
window of my room and practiced secretly. I guess my parents suspected 
something already because I hid myself in the room everyday at the same 
time. One day, I forgot to lock the window when I tried to practice and my 
parents found out about it. They screamed to me and asked what I was 
doing. I was really in panic and didn’t know what to do. My mother got 
very emotional, she started crying and asked me to leave the house, and 
she even started to pack my stuff. My father tried to stop her and asked me 
to go apologize to her. So, I had to apologize to my parents and said I 
wouldn’t do it again. However, I still converted to Islam once I turned 18 
(the legal age for religious conversion in Malaysia without the approval 
from parents). I did not tell many of my friends about my conversion and 
kept it secret from my parents.  I planned for the worst case scenario and 
started to work part-time, because in case my parents kicked me out from 
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home, I still have money to survive…Unfortunately, it was  the day before I 
left home for university in [different city] that , my mother found my Kad 
Islam (card that prove Muslim convert status). When I came back home, I 
saw my parents sitting there and my card was there. My father asked me 
“what is this inside your wallet? What does it mean?” Since my parents 
cannot read Malay, I just said ‘nothing, nothing’ and just skipped it. 
Luckily, I was leaving home the next day and it gave a break from 
confronting my parents again and again….I guess they know that I was 
converted, because the card stated my name and my Muslim name. I think 
they just didn’t want to make a scene right before I left home then….Now, 
when I go back home for visit, they just pretend that they don’t know….I 
might tell them later, maybe after my study. Although I guess that they 
already knew about it somehow, for instance when my Malay friends come 
over to my house they greet me in the Islamic way, I don’t think that they 
will accept it openly. I think if I tell them directly, there will be a big fight 
and I don’t want that happen’.  
  
 The majority of my respondents do not face any objections from their brothers 
or sisters about their conversion. There are only two cases who reported that since 
their siblings were Christians, they were persuaded to become Christians instead. One 
case reported that the convert’s only sister rejected his conversion because it made 
their parents unhappy. However, generally, pressure from the same generation is 
much lesser than from the elder generation in the family. Experiences, level of 
education and understanding of Islam amongst the younger generation make them 
 95 
more sympathetic to the convert as it is easier for them to relate to and understand the 
convert’s situation. 
 
 Ten respondents said they had more Chinese friends before conversion and did 
not loose their friendships after conversion although a handful of their friends showed 
negative responses towards their conversion and even cut off friendships with them. 
Five respondents said that they had more or less the same number of Chinese and 
Malay friends before conversion. After conversion, they tended to hang out with their 
Malay and Muslim friends more than Chinese friends. Three respondents reported that 
even before conversion, they had more Malay friends than Chinese friends so the 
situation did not changed much after the conversion. These converts experienced 
different reactions from their friends. Generally, the respondents reported that usually 
their Chinese friends had stronger negative reactions towards their conversion. Malay 
friends were reported as more supportive and welcomed their decision of conversion. 
In many cases, Malay friends served as the major motivating factor of conversion and 
these friends usually played a significant role in the post-conversion period as they 
helped the converts understand Islam. Since religious conversion is a gradual process 
and the respondents did not announce their conversion publicly, it was common that 
their friends only found out about their conversions some time after. Extreme 
responses from friends were uncommon as compared to reactions from parents.  
 
 Although the reaction of the converts’ family and friends and the magnitude of 
objection might vary, their main concern was often about reactions from the ‘Chinese 
community’. For the family, the focus may at times be, more narrowly, on the need to 
preserve the integrity of the kin group. For the members of the older generation, 
 96 
commitment to the minority appeared to be a commitment to the traditional lifestyle 
and values of its members. Respondents were sharply aware of their parents’ wishes 
to maintain and even enhance the distinctiveness of the Chinese community, although 
the very definition of that community could vary between families and between 
contexts. 
 
For some of them, maintaining the kinship through name and strong 
relationship in family were the major concerns. Han said: 
 
‘I think my parents worry that once I converted, I have to change my name 
and I cannot pass my name to the next generation. Since I am the only son 
in the family, they are afraid that I cannot continue the kinship by passing 
the surname.’ 
  
 For some of them, maintaining kinship or culture might not be the main 
concern, but the concern was about ‘not becoming Malay’ such as found in Sherman’s 
experience:  
 
‘My family, particularly my father and some of the relatives, really 
couldn’t take…they believed that once I converted to Islam, I am becoming 
Malay. Another major problem is that once converted to Islam, we are 
expected to have a Muslim name. My family misunderstood that I now 
have Malay name. Their mentality is that: once you convert, you change 
your name, which means you are cutting off the relationship with them.’  
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 Similar responses were found amongst the respondents’ friends who also 
shared this view that ‘conversion to Islam is becoming Malay’. When Han’s friend 
found out that he converted to Islam, they asked him ‘why do you want to convert? 
Why don’t you stick with your own religion? Why do you want to become Malay?’  
 
 Social pressure, especially those from extended family was another major 
reason for parental objection. As described by Terri (46, converted for 23 years) that 
hostility from members of the Chinese community was one of the major concerns of 
her parents about her conversion:  
 
‘My family has a business and we know many people in town. When people 
found out that I converted to Islam and married a Malay, my family was 
not happy with me, even the whole town was angry with me, especially the 
Chinese. I remember one time there was a taxi driver who used to do 
business with us, he drove by and scolded me, saying that I’m ashamed to 
be Chinese. I think this is what makes my family feel ashamed and oppose 
my decision. After all, we are the business family in town and people talk 
about us a lot.’ 
 
Negotiating Ethnic Boundaries: Responding to Challenges along the Cultural 
Dimension 
 In responding to the challenges to their Chinese identity from their family and 
friends, the Chinese Muslim converts consciously maintained and negotiated their 
Chinese identity. Their negotiation of religious and ethnic boundaries was mainly 
based on the structure of daily routine and cultural practices.  Preferences in matters 
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such as clothing, food and language can act as a powerful and pervasive ethnic 
boundary marker insofar as the members of a minority group distinguish themselves 
from the majority along these lines. Some theorists have argued that where the 
descendants of immigrants very visibly and self-consciously follow what they deem 
to be the cultural traditions of their forefathers, this signifies a nostalgic or romantic 
attachment to a way of life that has only intermittent bearing on their day-to-day 
behavior. Such expressions of ethnicity among socially mobile ‘ethnics’ in the United 
States have been referred to by Gans (1979) as ‘symbolic’, and represent for Steinberg 
(1981) a ‘crisis of authenticity’. Taking these arguments into account, it becomes 
clear that it is important not to consider elements of ‘cultural practices’ amongst my 
respondents in isolation. It is only by looking at the various dimensions of their 
ethnicity that it is possible to understand that if their interests in ‘cultural practices’ 
can be described as symbolic. It is because these practices symbolize not only a 
perceived link with their family’s place of origin and past, but also the many other 
meanings entailed by life as ‘Chinese’.  
 
 Respondents tend to use celebrating Chinese festivities to indicate Chinese 
cultural practice and to ascertain that they are still Chinese. Most of the respondents 
specifically mentioned that Muslims could celebrate these Chinese festivities as long 
as they did not participate in religious rituals. For instance, Lee (42, converted for 10 
years) said that he is Chinese because: 
‘I celebrate Chinese New Year19. I will go back to my mother’s home for 
Chinese New Year. On Ching Ming Festival20 she wants to go back to 
                                                 
19
 Chinese New Year is the first dya of New Year based on the lunar calendar. It is considered as the 
most important festival for Chinese. Houses are cleaned and decorated. Each family will have a reunion 
dinner on New Year’s Eve and every member of the family is expected to be present. It is also 
important to worship the ancestors on New Year’s Even and also the first day of New Year. Worship of 
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hometown, I will go back with her, but I don’t go to the praying stuff, you 
know, burning incense and all these’.  
 
 Ong also said that he went home every year and would celebrate the Ching 
Ming Festival with his mother. He would accompany his mother to his ancestors’ 
grave and sometimes helped to clean up the grave. Chinese Religion practice is 
embedded with cultural practices and it is too complex to have a clear definition on 
religious rituals and cultural practices. It is arguable that the act of ‘celebrating’ Ching 
Ming Festival is religious in nature because one has to believe the spirit of ancestors 
and the offering of incense and food to the spirit is worship rituals. However, as Ong 
described,  
 
‘I go with my mother just because I don’t want her to go there by herself. 
It is not like I worship the ancestors or something. It is something that she 
wants to do every year. And I want to accompany her because it is a long 
way to go back to home town, and the graves are up to the mountain. It is 
tough for her to do it on her own. Besides, I don’t want her to feel that I 
turn into a different person after I became Muslim … I help to clean the 
area around the grave, taking away the weed, something like that. I would 
not offer incense or food to the grave. I find my way to skip that part.’  
 
 Fifteen out of 18 respondents mentioned that they went back to their 
hometown and celebrate Chinese New Year with families, as long as they did not 
                                                                                                                                            
the ancestors and worship to the God of Heaven are important parts in the celebration (for details, see 
Wong 1987; Lai 1984; Lo & Comber 1958) 
20
 Ching Ming Festival, falls in the 3rd month of lunar calendar, is when Chinese families show their 
respect by visiting the graves of their ancestors to clear away weeds, touch up gravestone inscriptions 
and make offerings of wine and fruit. 
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have to participate in the ancestor and idol worship or had to eat non-halal food. 
Yaman mentioned that sometimes there was tension during the re-union dinner when 
his grandmother offered him alcohol drink and pork and he refused to take it. 
 
‘Actually my family did not have very strong response to my conversion. 
Of course my mother was not very happy with that but it’s OK.  My sister 
and her husband are Christian and my mother is Buddhist, so generally we 
respect each other’s religion at home. It is easier for them to understand. 
But for the older generation, it is more difficult. I remember that one time, 
during Chinese New Year, I was at my grandma’s place for the reunion 
dinner. She offered me beer, and kept asking me why I didn’t drink beer. I 
said I didn’t want it, but you know, for old people it could be offending. My 
mom tried to help me to explain. But we couldn’t tell her the reason is that 
I converted to Islam and that’s why I could not drink beer. So, there was 
some tension, but not very serious…but generally, my family is very 
understanding about this.’ 
  
For Fareed, celebrating Chinese New Year is important not only as a way to 
tell others that he is conscious about his Chinese identity but to clarify their 
misunderstanding of Islam. 
 
‘It is important to identify certain Chinese culture that is not against Islam, 
like celebrating Chinese New Year and the Mid-Autumn festival21. Chinese 
                                                 
21
  Mid-Autumn Festival, falls on the 15th of the eighth month of the lunar calendar. It originated from 
China when the Chinese overthrew the Mongol Empire under the Yuan dynasty. It is also another 
important festival for Chinese because it is another time for family reunion (for details, see Wong 1987; 
Lai 1984; Lo & Comber 1958) 
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Muslims can celebrate Chinese New Year in a cultural way, but not in a 
religious way. Chinese New Year is a day to celebrate the arrival of spring, 
but not only about praying to different gods and goodness. We can 
celebrate Chinese New Year in Islamic way.’ 
 
 Other than celebrating Chinese festivals, the kind of food they eat and the 
utilities they use for eating become relevant ethnic indicators for some of the converts. 
By using chopsticks to eat dim-sum, wanton noodle and food prepared in ‘Chinese–
style’ without pork and according to the halal-standard become something relevant to 
show to the others that they are still maintaining their Chinese identity.  
 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, name changing is important in both the 
construction of Muslim identity and maintaining Chinese identity in the process of 
religious conversion for Chinese Muslim converts. Although it is an important process 
to signify their Muslim identity publicly, not many respondents would completely 
give up their Chinese name. The importance of Chinese surname for Chinese Muslim 
converts in terms of maintaining their Chinese identity is best shown in how they pass 
their surname to their next generation. The major function of Chinese surname is to 
pass to the next generation so that people can trace back the origin of their ancestors 
and maintain the network among the family. The five married male respondents with 
children demonstrated similar concerns over passing their surnames to their children. 
Because of the patrilineal system, the two of the married female respondents with 
children showed a different attitude towards this issue because their children adopted 
their husband’s surname. For the male respondents, four of them emphasized the 
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importance of passing their family name to their children. In the case of Sherman, he 
said that  
 
‘On my children’s birth certificate, they all have Islamic names followed 
by Chinese names. It is very important for them to know about their 
surname because it is passed on from our ancestors’.  
 
Sayid (45, convert for 25 years), Fareed and Ibraheem (49, convert for 27 
years) also provided similar reasons that passing their surnames to their children is 
important for them to know about their Chinese root. However, three of them did not 
give a Chinese personal name to their children but only an Islamic name followed by 
their surnames.  
 
Reinterpreting Culture: the Common Ground between Islam and Chinese 
Culture 
 As indicated by Nagel (1998), while boundaries answer the question of ‘who 
are we?’ culture provides the content and meaning of ethnicity and answers the 
question of ‘what are we?’. Cultural revisions and innovations occur when current 
cultural elements are changed or when new cultural forms or practices are created. 
When Chinese Muslim converts faced challenges to their ethnic identity because of 
their different religious beliefs from the majority of Chinese population in Malaysia, 
they tried to relate themselves to the cultural context in favor of their situation. 
Chinese Muslims in China serves as a source of reference to them.  During my 
interview with the President of MACAM, Dato Mustapha Ma, and its committee 
members, I found that establishing a closer network with Chinese Muslims from 
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China, Taiwan and Hong Kong is one of their main objectives. I was told that ‘there 
are even more Muslim in China than in Malaysia’. By looking to China, the supposed 
origin for Chinese culture, these converts are finding a way to authenticate the idea 
that the Chinese identity is compatible with Islamic beliefs. Furthermore, as pointed 
out by Rosey Ma in her studies, there is growing interests within the government, the 
academia and local media on the issue of a growing Muslim population in China (Ma 
1996: 60). The issue was debated in the “International Seminar on Islam and 
Confucianism: A Civilizational Dialogue” which was supported by the Malaysian 
government and organized by the University of Malaya in 1995. This seminar also 
provided a great opportunity for Chinese Muslim coverts to have new sources of 
identifications with their Chineseness.   
  
During the course of the interviews, five respondents mentioned to me about 
the compatibility between Confucianism and the teachings of Islam. When we were 
talking about understanding the doctrine of Islam, Hassan expressed the following 
views:  
 
‘I realize that Islam is not actually something foreign, but it is a universal 
teaching for all human being. In the Qur’an, it is mentioned that the divine 
had created different people of different tribe. The divine is for everybody, 
not only for the Arab or the Malay. That means, even there are different 
religions for different people from different culture, the teaching from God 
is basically from the same one source, even for the Chinese group… is 
mentioned in Qur’an that the messages were sent from the God is suitable 
for the people of that particular time. Confucianism could be one of it….It 
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is mentioned in the Qur’an that apart from the 27 main prophets, there 
were another 124000 prophets.. It is believed that these 12400 prophets 
had been sent to people of different places in specific periods of time. I 
read some of the analysis saying that Confucius could be one of the 
prophets mentioned in Islam, which I think is very true and trustable.’ 
 
 Here it is not my intention to go into the details of the text of Qur’an nor can I 
validate the information provided. However, this comment signifies the way the 
converts take particular information and use it as a source to reassert the compatibility 
between Chinese and Islamic identity. This is also indicated in Ong’s reaction below:   
 
‘I think it is good that we try to find common positive elements in 
Confucianism that can also be found in Islam. Because it is a good way to 
show to the Chinese community that Islamic values also exist in our 
ancestry. For instance, respect to the elders, respect to our parents – these 
are parts of Islamic teachings too. I think it is good if we can show to the 
people that there are common values between Confucianism and Islam.’ 
 
 When talk about the importance of maintaining Chinese culture in the post-
conversion period, Ibrahim said: 
 
‘It is important to maintain what is good in Chinese culture. Chinese 
civilization is a long civilization and there are so many things that you can 
learn from it. All civilizations in the world, although they appear 
differently, show the greatness of God. So any culture and practices, as 
 105 
long as that is not against the law, we should keep it….Actually, if you 
really study about Islam, there you will find that there are a lot of 
commonalities with Chinese culture. For instance, if you look at the 
Chinese character 天 [sky, heaven, or universe in symbolic sense], it is 
composed by two parts, that is 一 [one] and 大 [big], which implies that 
God is the greatest and the only, which is exactly the same as what we are 
talking about in Islam’.  
 
 It is interesting to find that this phenomenon is not unique for Chinese Muslim 
converts but can also be found amongst Chinese Christian converts (Yang 1999). By 
finding the common grounds between the traditional values of their own group and 
their newly entered new group, converts feel that they do not need to give up 
everything they used to have in order to still be accepted by the new group.  
 
Concluding the Chapter 
 As suggested by Goffman, shared background knowledge about people and 
circumstance is important during social interaction. It provides us with a basis to 
typify or normalize our view of everyday events and to understand everything that 
happens around us (Goffman 1959). Chinese converting to Islam is a challenge to the 
background knowledge that is shared by their audience, particularly their Chinese-
ness to others, because of the change of habits, beliefs and practices. Thus, in order to 
reconcile the problem, Chinese Muslim converts have to negotiate their new identity 
based on the ‘everyday rules’ that serve as the guidelines about the kind of things that 
happen during face-to-face interaction with their Chinese counterparts. As indicated 
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by Goffman (1963), background assumptions are the ‘syntax’ of everyday behavior, 
without which the ‘language’ of behavior is incomprehensible.  
 
What we see in the new expression of Chinese identity among the Muslim 
converts, and more narrowly in how my respondents spoke of what it is to be Chinese, 
is increasing self-assertiveness and personal creativity. The ethnic boundaries are 
being actively reshaped by individuals who are ready to question and subvert many 
previously taken-for-granted notions of identity. There is no ambivalence over their 
ethnic identity whatsoever, because all respondents confirmed their Chinese identity 
without any hesitation.  
 
 Individuals cannot completely forget the previous meaning of his social world 
even after transition. Change requires a process of resocialization. It is more difficult 
than the process of socialization in the previous world because it is affected by 
existing meanings within the individual self. An individual tends to reshape or modify 
her or his world view when s/he enters the new province of meaning. For some of the 
converts in the present sample, transition to the new province of the Islamic world 
view is not necessarily accompanied by a complete change of their social and ethnic 
world. That is to say, although the Chinese converted to Islam, it does not mean that 
they are giving up or betraying their Chinese identity. 
 
 Family hostility serves as the main motivation for Chinese Muslim converts to 
reconcile the dissonance between their ethnic and religious identity. It is because the 
family is the socializing agent that shapes the convert’s existing ethnic identity. Since 
the respondents grew up in Chinese families and being Chinese is one of their primary 
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social identities, we find that during the process of conversion, their ethnic identity 
becomes challenged and they responded by reasserting their Chinese identity. As their 
families become their significant other upon their conversion, these converts strove to 
reconcile their ethnic and religious identity to show to their families that they are still 
Chinese despite their conversion.  
 
 Two major practices demonstrate how Chinese Muslim converts negotiate 
their ethnic and religious boundaries. Firstly, they participate in Chinese festivities yet 
not taking part in religious rituals in order not to contravene their new beliefs. 
Secondly, in response to their families’ concern of losing ties with their kinsmen, 
some respondents consciously maintained their original surnames and passed it on to 
their children. However, most of their children no longer bear Chinese first name.  
 
 Although the lives of the individuals studied here changed markedly as a result 
of their conversion experience, in adopting new beliefs and life-styles, these changes 
do not necessarily shake their pre-conversion non-religious identity. Instead of 
completely shifting away from what they used to be, some of these Chinese Muslim 
converts explore the commonality between Islam and Chinese civilizations in order to 
make themselves feel better about their new identity as both Chinese and Muslims. As 
an example, the cultural context of China serves as ‘background information’ that 
they as Chinese Muslims can relate to, while it can also serve as a site of reference for 
others who question their identity. 
 
 It is my contention that the flaw in much of what is said about Chinese 
Muslims giving up their Chinese identity is that it fails to consider the extent to which 
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the individuals in question may themselves actually wish to maintain some of the 
traditionalist conceptions of ethnicity that they learn from their parents and indeed 
from the wider society. To differentiate between coercive, imposed social definitions 
and personal, creative expressions of group belonging is, I believe, to construct a false 
dichotomy. It should be recognized that communities are created and recreated by the 
collective actions and attitudes of individuals who, to varying degrees, refer to and 
feel bound by (real or perceived) history and ancestry. As Berger and Luckmann have 
reminded us, in their exploration of the dialectical process by which ‘reality’ is 
socially constructed, the institutional world has for social actors a massive objectivity 
even while it is ‘a humanly produced, constructed objectivity’ (1976: 78).  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 In the cases of Chinese Muslim converts studied in this project, religious 
conversion does not eradicate ethnic identity in terms of converts’ self understanding 
of being Chinese. Identity is not a static entity possessed by the individual, but rather, 
is an ever-changing, socially and situationally influenced, and influencing, element in 
flux. Chinese Muslim converts’ conversion is a process of ‘turning around’ or 
changing direction in life, which refers to a change of world view especially (Roberts 
1990). It is more than a shift of membership and performance of ritual but a process 
of ‘reality construction (Straus 1976) which includes a ‘reorganization of identity and 
meaning’ (Travisano 1970). New religious identity is constructed after conversion in 
order for new converts to be accepted in the new religious community. However, 
because of the strong association between the Muslim and Malay identity and the 
history of conflict between Malay and Chinese, which then engenders the hostility 
from the converts’ family towards their conversion, conversion puts Chinese Muslim 
converts in a very uncomfortable situation to handle their religious and ethnic identity.
   
 
Religious conversion may bring in new significant Others to the converts’ new 
social world, but it does not mean that they have to give up their old social world 
completely. Identity formation is a continual process. For Chinese Muslim converts, 
new significant others such as their Muslim counterparts may play an important role 
in shaping their new religious identity in the post-conversion period. However, pre-
conversion institutions (e.g. family), roles (e.g. daughter/son in family) and ethnicity 
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(e.g. being Chinese) that are in the convert’s social world before are still part of the 
social structure for the converts’ after conversion and they have to deal with it.  
 
 Negotiation between religious and ethnic identities is demonstrated when 
Chinese Muslim converts established their religious boundaries which defined their 
new religious identity. These boundaries, as I demonstrated in Chapter 4, are best 
reflected through religious oriented actions that bring significant changes and 
influence day-to-day interaction between Muslim and non-Muslim. These actions 
include change of name, which symbolized the very first step of changing identity of 
converts in public manner; change of beliefs, practices and habits, including the 
formal practice of Islam rituals, observation of Islam’s dietary laws and prohibition of 
alcohol. However, in these processes of changes, maintaining their ethnic identity is 
always a concern for Chinese Muslim converts because they do not want to be 
considered ‘becoming Malay’ or betraying their ethnic traditions. Thus, we can see 
that converts have different responses to the issue of changing their names, in terms of 
whether they use their new Muslim name or their Chinese name to identify 
themselves.  
 
The identity negotiation requires that these Muslims accept a way of life that 
maintains their Chineseness. The negotiated identity allows them to maintain their 
Chineseness, including cultural practices, while not requiring that they deny their 
newly acquired faith. Chinese Muslim converts’ participation in Chinese festivities 
yet not taking part in religious rituals part in order not to contravene their new beliefs 
demonstrate this negotiated identity. Furthermore, their strategy of passing on their 
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Chinese surnames to their next generation is also a way to maintain their Chinese 
traditions without contradicting with their religious beliefs.  
 
Implications 
 This research provides an in-depth analysis on how religious converts 
negotiate between the new religious identity brought by conversion and their other 
(non-religious) existing identity. Although the case of Chinese Muslim converts is a 
unique situation, it provides us with a unique case study that allows us to probe into 
the dynamic process that converts of diverse religious and cultural backgrounds 
undergo. In conceptualizing religious identity change or conversion as an either/or 
proposition, it is also important for us to look at the subtlety of the individual’s 
identity negotiation.  
 
In future research on this particular subject, it would be useful to recruit 
research subjects in different ways. With my method of recruiting research subjects 
through Islamic organizations and university I am not able to gain access to the group 
of converts who are not affiliated with these institutions. This is a group inclined to 
identify with the Chinese community who practice and are interested in learning more 
about Islam. However, those converts who no longer identify themselves as Chinese 
and those who converted but no longer practice the religion are not included in this 
study. In order to have a more comprehensive understanding of the situation of all 
different Chinese Muslim converts, it would be useful, with the benefits of more time 
and more experience, to more carefully choose a more representative sample, through 
visiting mosques and recruiting subjects through more extended network.  
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 Further topics of related interest include a comparison of the narratives of new 
converts and experienced converts, and a deeper exploration of how they discuss their 
own, and each others’, experience of conversion and identity development.  
 
 It is also useful to compare the identity construction and negotiation that an 
individual undergoes in religious conversion with identity construction and 
negotiation through a number of other situations. In other social contexts, religion and 
ethnicity may not be the only battlefield of identity conflict but there are other aspects 
of identity. For example, it could be conflict between homosexuality and religious 
identity.  
 
 To conclude, except for the hermit who does not need to encounter any social 
interaction with others, identity negotiation appears to be unavoidable in the modern 
world. The more complex a society is, the more different identities individuals have, 
thus the more chances of conflict between these identities. It will be important for us 
to understand the dynamic in between different aspects of one’s identity and how they 
negotiate with each other. By discussing the negotiation between Chinese Muslim 
converts’ religious and ethnic identity, this study hopes to provide a case study that is 
useful for the enhancement of the field of religious conversion and identity 
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Gender Male / Female 
Educational Background Primary / Secondary / College / Bachelor Degree Holder / 
Master Degree Holder / PhD Degree Holder 
Language of Education Primary: Chinese / English / Malay 
Secondary: Chinese / English / Malay 
Martial Status Single / Married** / Divorced ** / Widowed ** 
** Please specify your spouse’s ethnicity: 





Dialect(s) you can 
speak? 
 
When you embraced 
Islam? 
 
Are you a member of 
any of these 
organizations? 
PERKIM/ Islamic Outreach ABIM / Malaysian Chinese 
Muslims Association (MACMA)/ Darul Fitrah / None of 
the above 
Are you a member of 
any of these political 
parties? 
UMNO / PAS / MCA / None of the above 
 
Family Background 
Father’s Educational Background Primary / Secondary / College / Bachelor Degree 
Holder / Master Degree Holder / PhD Degree 
Holder 
Father’s Occupation  
Father’s Religion  
Mother’s Educational 
Background 
Primary / Secondary / College / Bachelor Degree 
Holder / Master Degree Holder / PhD Degree 
Holder 
Mother’s Occupation  
Mother’s Religion  
Do you have any children? Yes**/ No 




Appendix IV: Interview Schedule 
 
Section 1: Respondent’s background 
 Age 
 Educational background (highest education achieved/ schooling environment 
[national school independent Chinese school, overseas etc] )  
 Current and previous occupation  
 Family background (parent’s education/ economic situation) 
 
Section 2: Family relations  
 Family origin and dialects 
 Gender relations 
 Marriage  
Questions:  
 What is the ethnicity of your spouse (if any)/ father/ mother/ closest friends? 
 What is the religion of your father/ mother/ brothers/ sisters/ closest friends? 
 Before you converted, how happy was your relationships with your father/ 
mother/ brothers and sisters? 
 What were the reactions of these 4 groups of people to your decision to 
embrace the Islamic religion? (Father/ mother/ brothers and sisters/ closed 
friends) Could you please explain the reasons for their reactions? 
 Did you expect any changes in their behavior towards you after your 
conversion? Were there any changes in their behavior towards you after your 
conversion? If there were, please describe these changes and your explanation 
for these changes. 
 
Section 3: Ethnicity and identity 
 How would you describe your identity? 
 What does it mean to be Chinese? 
 What does it mean to be Malaysian? 
 Experience of discrimination 
Question: 
 Do you consider yourself Chinese? What makes you “Chinese”? What makes 
you are different with Malay and Indian or other groups? 
 Do you consider yourself Malaysian? 
 When do you think that Ethnicity is significant in your life? For example, 
elections? 
 Do you think Islam as a religion can help you to define your identity? 
 Why do you wear (or not wear) Malay attires?  
 Did you change your name on your IC card? 
 
Section 4: Conversion 
 The total environment before conversion  
 What is the critical incident for the decision of conversion 
Questions: 
 When did you convert to Islam? 
 What was your knowledge about the Islamic religion before you embraced 
Islam? 
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 What were your reasons for embracing the Islamic religion? What is the 
critical incident for deciding your conversion? 
 Where did you learn about Islam (before and after conversion)? In what 
language? When you have problems before/during/after conversion, who or 
where do you seek help? 
 Are you attached with any following organizations: PERKIM, Islamic 
Outreach ABIM, Malaysian Chinese Muslim Association (MACMA)? If so, 
how the does the organization assist you in understanding Islamic religion? 
 Please describe how you felt when you embraced the Islamic religion 
 What were some of the most difficult problems you had to face when you 
became a Muslim? 
 What was your religion before you became a Muslim? 
 Did you see your previous religion as the only true religion for man? Why? 
 Did you fully believe all the teachings of your previous religion? Why? 
 How often did you attend the religious services in the place of worship of your 
previous religion (Church? Chinese temple? Indian temple? Others?) 
 How often did you used to pray? (very regularly/ seldom/ never unless really 
necessary) 
 Did you follow closely the rules about eating habits (if any) of your previous 
religion? If so, what kind of rules they are? 
 
Section 5: Religion 
 Level of religious practice (number of mosque visit/ number of prayer daily) 
 Religion and morality 
 Respondent’s view on particular issues (such as the September 11 attack; the 
war in Iraq etc.) 
Questions:  
 Do you see the Islamic religion as the only true religion for man? Why? 
 Do you fully believe all the teachings of the Islamic religion? Why? 
 How often do you attend the religious services in the mosque? (more than 
once a week or every week/ 2 or 3 times a month/ once a month/ only on 
festive and special occasions/ once a year or never) 
 How often do you pray? 
 Do you fast during the Fasting Month (Ramhdan) and follow the other rules 
about food? (Please state what these rules are) 
 When you had an important decision to make in your life, how often did you 
try to find out what (God / your religion) wanted you to do? (Often/ Seldom/ 
Never) 
 
 
 
